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INTRODUCTION
Japan* Graat Britain* and the United Stataa aorappad 
vaat anounta of naval tonnage following the Washington Con­
ferences f 1921-1922. They haltad thair competition in naval 
building which waa requiring avar increasing sums and in tha 
minda of many Japanese poaad tha threat of war* particularly 
war between Japan and the United Stataa. Stratagiata of tha 
Plana Diviaion of tha American navy thought of Japan aa tha 
principal potential enemy of tha United Stataa* while Japa­
nese naval strategists considered Amarioa to be thair prin­
cipal potential enemy. The agreement between Japan and the 
United States to limit capital ships ended a building raea in 
a type of vessel considered to be "offensive" and channeled 
that race into other areas* such as oruisers. One must 
remember that people considered one of the lessons of the 
First World War to be that arms races* particularly naval 
races lead to war. Therefore* tha Five Power Treaty on Naval 
Arms Limitation* which was signed on February 6* 1922* second 
to most contemporary observers to bode well for tha future 
of the Pacific region and the avoidance of future conflicts. 
The Pact of Paris, which outlawed war as an instrument of 
national policy, was also signed by numerous nations during 
the decade of the 1920s, including Japan* Great Britain* and 
idle United Btatea.
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During the course of the t e n  reduction negotiitloiis 
held at Washington in lata 1921 and aarly 1922, tha Japa- 
naaa prasantad thair perception of the defensive needs of 
the empire to justify thair positions. These defensive 
needs ware in large measure a reflection of their perception 
of the offensive capabilities of the united States. This 
perception was integrally related to Japanese fear of the 
power of the U.S., and desire to be treated as an equal 
among the major world powers. These fears of and attitudes 
toward American naval programs were very similar to the fear 
of encirclement which engulfed the leaders of the Japanese 
nation in 1941 and made them feel it necessary to strike out 
before it was too late. These u s e  fears and the desire for 
equality were regularly expressed in the press.
Zn this paper I am asking and hope to provide an 
answer to the following questions. What were Japanese press 
images of American naval policies immediately preceding, 
during, and with the conclusion of the Washington Conference? 
How did these images relate to the changes in American policy, 
that is were tha editors well-informed? What were their 
views on Japanese naval expansion? Does thair often repeated 
desire for disarmament seem to be more related to fear of 
the u.8., or to the desire to out naval expenditures and 
decrease the intragovernmantal power of the military in gen­
eral, and the navy in particular? What were tha attitudes of 
the opposition and the parties in power, toward these same
issues? In the statements of governmental figures is there 
•vidanoa of a ralationahip batman images of American policy 
and poaitiona takan? What typa of propaganda battla was 
waged to dafand tha navy'a poaitiona? X will attempt to 
aacartain thaaa opiniona through statements publiahad in tha 
English language dallies, tha interpellations and raaponaaa 
to intarpallationa in tha Diet publiahad in those a a m  
papara, and tha raoorda of tha Waahington Confaranoa.
X argue that there waa a vary fine line between thoaa 
American naval policiea which ware not deemed too frightening 
by tha press, the political members of the government, and 
tha navy, and thoaa which ware aeen aa a ohalleag* to Japan's 
ability to dafand herself, and thereby incited fear la the 
haarta of them people. Whan American naval policiea erosaed 
that line and ware implemented in tandem with diplomatic 
opposition to Japanese programs and policiea in tha Par Bast, 
Japanese fait that their sovereignty and their rights in 
Asia, specifically in China, ware being attacked. Thaaa 
same type of fears engulfed peraons in 1940 and 1941 and did 
not allow them to make what we in tha West would call rational 
decisions, particularly tha decision to attack Pearl harbor.
Hara Kei, the Prime Minister of Japan wrote in a 
1920 issue of tha Outlookt
We are told to "do unto others as we would they 
should do unto us." But unless we first learn hew 
"others" wish to be traated before we proceed to put 
the golden rule into practice X am aftdid it may peeve 
to be even a source of trouble and misunderstanding.
There is a distinct possibility of finding that others
are not like ourselves and sotting oat to know bow 
otters wish to bo treated, lot us fix in mini that 
just ss ono man is differont fro* his neighbor, so 
one nation is different from another in wants, views, 
and outlook on life. . . .*
There is an underlying principle of human behavior which 
makes me feel a study which emphasises images and impres­
sions is a valuable one. Decisions are based in large part 
on accumulated cultural baggage which shapes one's method of 
thinking, first hand experiences, knowledge obtained vicari­
ously, and impressions of the policies of others. These 
impressions are treated as truth by the person concerned.
The Japanese press often saw naval hogepaan where nose existed) 
this oan in part at least be attributed bo tbs propaganda 
campaign waged by the navy, which was dseigwd to iweteill 
a fear of American naval policies in tbs hearts and minds of 
the editors and the people. To examine tl» images and 
impressions which the press and public figures had of 
American naval policies is to try and understand Why seme 
people were afraid of the United States, why others ware 
more trusting, and the way in whiah they wanted to protect 
their rights.
Both during World Whr II, and in retrospect as well, 
most Americans have viewed America's part in the Japenese- 
Ameriean conflict as a just one. But it would be a strange 
thing for the victors in a war to claim it was unjust. Been 
if there were soae abstract, objective s»easierd by which age 
could easily discern the "just" side in e conflict, it would
■till be necessary to examine impressions of the events which 
were the main areas of contention in order to understand the 
decisions which led to confliot and later were looked back 
upon with a suspicious eye. zt is often suggested that erne 
reason why the leaders of the Soviet Onion feel it necessary 
to maintain powerful military forces is their fear of being 
attacked that is based on their remembratu'e of the massive 
loss of physical property and human lives of World War XZ.
Zn a very real sense the Soviet leaders are probably afraid 
of the United States. By looking at the images held by the 
Japanese who were afraid of the united states* it may bs 
possible to learn seme of the principles by which nations 
translate imagery into behavior.
CHAPTER 1
PRE-WA8HINGT0N CONFERENCE! NAVAL IMAGES AMD 
THE STRATEGIC SITUATION
The Japanese-Amerlean Naval Problem 1898-1914i
An Overview
For 50 years before the arrival of Perry's "black 
ships” there was a debate carried on in Japan concerning the 
resumption of foreign contact* a debate which usually took 
the form of a discussion of maritime security. After the 
defeat of the Russian Navy* in 190? Japanese generals* 
admirals* and politicians met to determine the military 
resources necessary to ensure the defense of the empire.
They agreed these would be 25 army divisions and 16 capital 
ships. The capital ships ware to be eight battleships and 
eight battlecruisers all under eight years of age the ”8-8" 
plan.3 The 8-8 plan remained the official goal of the Japa­
nese navy until the stirrings for disarmament began in lata 
1920 and spread through the three major naval powers of the 
world* the United States, Great Britain* and Japan* Airing 
1921. Admiral Baron Kato Tomosaburo, the Minister of the 
Navy, explained the 8-8 plan in an interview with an AP cor­
respondent in April 1921.
Xn formulating the 8 unit fleet, the Imperial Japanese 
Navy had no imaginary enemy in view. The scheme was 
laid down only on the conviotion that it was the minimum 
capable of being constructed and maintained by this
Bapir*, adequate for the effective defense of thi* 
eatlee against all possible future complications in 
the Far East.4
Japan adopted the 8-8 plan after America had 
acquired Eastern Pacific possessions. The Spanieh-Ametican 
Ear of Itft resulted in an altered naval balance of power in 
the Western Pacific. The United States annexed the Philip** 
pines and Guam, and during the same year annexed Hawaii. The 
goal of American naval men and their supporters in Congress 
became to maintain a "fleet second to none but that of Great 
Britain."5 Since from 1904 to 1914 Germany had the second 
most powerful navy in the world, the standard for the desired 
strength of the American navy was that of the German navy. 
According to Akira Zriye the Japanese were relatively pleased 
with the annexation of the Philippines by the United States
gas it was considered a friendly power. Nonetheless the 
American acquisition of the Philippines and Guam formed the 
basis for a later American naval challenge to Japan and con* 
sequently a Japanese naval challenge to the United States*
The Philippines, lying a great distance from the continental 
United States and Hawaii, were very difficult to defend with­
out a powerful fleet. A fleet powerful enough to defend the 
Philippines was also powerful enough to defeat the Imperial 
Japanese Navy in the waters of the Northwest Pacific whose 
defense had been determined vital to the integrity of the 
empire. A relatively weakly-fortified Philippines would be 
easy for Japan to conquer, but if fortified would be highly
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defansible and thus could be used as a base for an attack on 
the Japanese Empire. Theodore Roosevelt realized the vul­
nerability of these islands and the problems which that vul­
nerability posed. Be wrote in 1904t "If we are not prepared 
to establish a strong and suitable base for our navy in the 
Philippines then we had far better give up the Philippine
7Islands entirely."
Greet Britain and Germany engaged In Intense naval 
competition from 1904 to 1914. The introduction of the 
Dreadnought class of battleship by Great Britain not only 
rendered the predreadnoughts of Germany obsolete, it rendered 
the predreadnoughts of England obsolete, placing Great Britain 
and Germany at an approximately equal starting point in dread-
q
nought construction. Germany's intensive naval construction 
program, with its avowed aim of smashing British power, 
forced Great Britain to concentrate the bulk of its fleet 
in the North Sea in order to be ready at any time to meet 
the German fleet with overwhelming force. By August 1914 the 
British Grand Fleet had 20 dreadnoughts compared to the 13
Qdreadnoughts of Germany's High Seas Fleet. Britain was by 
far the supreme naval power in the world and intended to 
remain that way using Germany as one power in its two power 
standard of naval strength. This two power standard pro­
vided that Great Britain would maintain naval strength 
greater than that of the next two naval powers.
In Asia the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was in place to 
protect British and Japanese interests. It had originally
-9
been negotiated to localize conflict! and defend against 
Russian aggression. Japan fought under its protection in 
the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 in which the Japanese navy 
destroyed the Russian fleet at Tsushima in one of the most 
decisive battles in military history. Great Britain and 
Japan renewed the pact during the Russo-Japanese War. The 
terms of the new agreement provided that the powers were 
obliged to assist each other in case of an attack by a 
single third power. Adding this renewal to the destruction 
of the Russian fleet gave Japan naval security in the north­
west Pacific. American naval security decreased because 
there were no Russian ships in the Pacific capable of seri­
ously diverting the Imperial Japanese Navy. At that point 
it would have required a fleet at least three times the sise 
of Japan's to defeat her.10 The alliance was renewed again 
in 1911 with Germany as the potential enemy in mind. It 
provided for the maintenance of peace in East Asia and 
India, the preservation of the territorial integrity of and 
equal opportunity in China, and the maintenance of the ter­
ritorial rights and special interests of the contracting 
powers in Eastern Asia and India. Both powers were obligated 
to assist each other in case of an unprovoked Attack or 
aggressive actions. Article 4 of the alliance statedi
Should either High contracting Party conclude a 
treaty of general arbitration with a third Power, it 
is agreed that nothing &  this Agreement shal entail 
vuion such contracting party an obligation to go to war with the MWhr with whom such treaty of arbitration is 
in force. *■*
-10
The United States In August of 1911 signed a treaty of gen­
eral arbitration with Great Britain but the Senate refused to 
ratify it. Obviously, even though Britain was bound literally 
by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance to assist Japan in ease of 
oonfliet with the United States, the original intention of 
the agreement was that she would not be, and as I will 
explain later this was the interpretation made by the British 
and Japanese governments in the years immediately following 
World War I.12
world War I and the Deterioration of Japanese-Amerioan
Relations
With the conclusion of the First World war there was 
a major shift in the naval balance of power. German naval 
power was destroyed and a large part of the German fleet was
13sunk by its own men at Scapa Flow. The navy of Great 
Britain was no longer faced with a major naval challenge in 
the North Sea and could afford to deploy its ships in other 
areas as it saw fit. In 1918 in actual fighting ships 
Britain's 42 dreadnoughts, 109 cruisers, 13 aircraft car­
riers, 527 destroyers and torpedo boats, and 137 submarines 
comprised a fleet which was greater than those of the other 
Allied and Associated Powers combined. The trident remained 
in the hands of the British, subject to the completion of the 
American 1916 building plan. France ceased to be a major 
naval power as its shipyards engaged in the manufacture of 
munitions for the armies of the Allies all during the war,
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to the neglect of naval construction. The two other 
nations whose naval power was enhanced by the confliot were 
the United States and Japan.
American naval expansion plans were embodied in the 
1916 building program which authorised the construction of 
10 battleships, 6 battlecruisers, 10 scout cruisers, 50 tor­
pedo boat destroyers, 9 ocean submarines, 58 ooastal sub­
marines, 3 fuel ships, 1 repair ship, 1 transport, 1 hospital 
ship, 2 destroyer tenders, 1 submarine tender, 2 ammunition 
ships and 2 gunboats. 6 However, the American government 
suspended work on the oapital ships during the war so that 
resources could be concentrated on the construction of 
destroyers, which were necessary to combat the German sub­
marines that were inflicting huge losses on the Allied mer­
chant fleets. By the conclusion of the war the American 
fleet had added a large number of destroyers and a few 
battleships but the 1916 building program was far from ful­
fillment.
The imperial Japanese Navy also saw action and was 
expanded during the war. It transported 500,000 troops from 
Australia to Europe, and Japanese naval squadrons worked in 
the anti-submarine warfare in the Mediterranean, took over 
patrol duties in Australian waters, and seised German island! 
north of the equator in the Pacific. In 1915 Admiral XatS 
Tomosaburo became Minister of the Navy and Admiral Shlmamura 
Hayao became Chief of the Naval General Staff. They worked
15
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together for naval expansion. Prime Minister Okuma was con­
vinced to complete the funding of three battleships which 
were under construction, and agreed to fund four more capital 
ships in the winter of 1915-1916 as the first step toward 
attaining the long desired 8-8 fleet. Hara Xei, who led the 
opposition seiyukai Party to victory in the Diet elections 
in the spring of 1917, worked out a plan to raise new taxes 
so that work oould be started on additional battlecruisers 
for the 8-8 fleet. Yet in 1918 Admirals Shimamura and XatS 
both concluded that it was necessary to examine vhe results 
of the war more carefully before taanrking on further naval 
expansion. The implications of the battle of Jutland were 
not yet completely clear, the Unite! States was not yet 
implementing its huge 1916 building plan, and the effective­
ness of submarines and aircraft needed to be examined.^*
In the fall of 1918 Hara Xei became Japan's first 
party Prime Minister. The financial state of the empire 
was poor; during September riots over increasing rice prices 
had sprung up all over the home islands. Hara, hoping to 
alleviate financial conditions and placate the services at 
the same time, reached a compromise over expansion with the 
service ministers and general staff chiefs. Hara had his 
Finance Minister Takahashi compose a stopgap budget without 
major increases for arms expansion. Xn exchange Hara pledged 
to find funds for completing the 8-8 plan beginning in fiscal 
1920. The expansion of the army was to occur during the
■ „ - :
later years of the 8-3 plan when the funds necessary for 
naval expansion would be smaller, thus freeing up funds for army 
expansion. He also pledged to increase government revenues 
if necessary to fund these expansion plans.^ Hara made 
a strong commitment for the expansion of the Japanese 
navy regardless of the fate of the American 1916 building 
plan.
Besides the proposed expansion of the Japanese and 
American fleets a number of other factors contributed to the 
changed naval situation of the post-war Pacific. These 
included the destruction of Russian and German power, tfith 
the Russian Revolution, Russia no longer loomed as an imme­
diate naval threat to Japanese interests from the North.
German power was totally removed from the Pacific. Japan 
seized German I acific islands north of the equator during 
the war and acquired German rights in the Chinese province 
of Jhantung. Great Britain acquired the German islands 
south of the Equator. During the war Britain and the United 
Jtates removed nearly all of their naval forces from the 
.acific allowing Japan to become the dominant naval power in 
the Northwest [acific. However, with the destruction of 
German power the United Jtates and Great Britain were free 
to redeploy their fleets and the threat which had motivated 
the second renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance ceased to 
exist.
The improvement of certain weapons, such as the sub­
marine and the airplane, left naval policy in many nations
in an unsettled stata and was a major factor in th* changed 
balance of naval power. The development of the submarine in 
particular improved the position of those nations wtiieh Host 
likely would be engaged in defensive battles. The value of 
these weapons to many was proven by the vast amounts Of 
merchant tonnage lost by the Allies to German submarines.
At the Washington Conference, French naval representatives 
argued the most vehemently that the value of submarines lay 
in their use as coastal defenders and their ability to 
increase the efficiency of the ooamunieations of a nation at 
wart but the French position was in large part supported by 
Italy, Japan, and the United states. Since many considered 
the use of submarines to sink unarmed merohant shipping with­
out warning as one of the horrors of the war, their value as 
commerce destroyers was not touted in the arguments for 
their retention. It would however be foolish to believe that 
this value was not part of the reason for the desire to retain 
submarines. The development of the airplane also improved the 
strategic position of the defender in naval warfare. Fimas 
based on land could be used to defend againet an attacking 
fleet, as could shore guns, but were mobile and had rapidly 
improving technical capabilities. In tbs opinion of ent 
naval strategist submarines and aircraft improved the capa­
bility of shore defease dramatically,3*
The development of defensive wanpons contributed In 
the controversy which arose in tritlah naval eirelaa ever lit
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•ffloaoy of the hug* battleship in light of the experiences 
of tho war. Some naval nan argued against tha construction 
of battlashipa. Thay claimed that sinea tha British Grand 
riaat had spent moat of tha war at Soapa Flow and in its 
only major battla with tha German flaat at Jutland was 
damaged by much smaller battleships, tha maintenance of 
huge battleships was a waste of money. 2 Vat it oame to be 
tha standard opinion of tha naval general staffs of great 
Britain, Japan, and tha United States that tha battleship 
was still tha main strength of a naval foroe. Admiral 
Kato spoke to tha Japanese Diet on Decsmber 21, 1*19; "The 
more we study tha lessons of tha war, tha stronger does our 
conviction grow that the last word in naval warfare rests 
with the big ship and tha big gun."2* the lessons to which 
Kato referred were embodied in tha design of a new type of 
battleship, tha superdraadnought. Far frost denying the 
principle of big ships and big guns it emphasized it. The 
superdraadnought had
guns of heavier calibret massive armour protection to 
protaot vital parts— including thick steel decks to 
resist projectiles fired at long range, and therefore 
descending at a steep angle; and a more complete system 
of bulkheading to localism the effect of underwater 
explosion; this method of minute subdivision being 
associated ia assn ships with external bulge protec­
tion. •*
The moat convincing evil*ware which exists for the belisf 
that the general staffs of the powers were convinced of the 
usefulness of the battleship m s  that their naval buildinu 
programs ell had tha espial ship as heir backbone.
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Post War Diplomatic Dlaputaa 
Between the end of the Great War In Noveo&a? |f|§ |#d 
the Invitations Issued by the government of the United fjbftifl 
In the suamer of 1921 by which the powers were Invited Iff the 
Washington Conference, many diplomatic dieputes arose between 
the United States and Japan. These disputes followed and in 
some cases were directly related to disputes which occurred 
during the war. The United States strongly opposed the impo­
sition of Japan's 21 Demands on China even though Japen 
withdrew the moet offensive group. The United States refused 
to recognise the legitimacy of the acquisition by the Japa­
nese of German rights in Shantung. The U.8. also beesaw 
opposed to the retention of Japanese troops in 8iberia after 
the withdrawal of American forces. However the United States 
and Japan did oonolude a bilateral agreement in 1917, the 
Lansing-Zshii Agreement, in which the governments recognised 
that "territorial propinquity creates special relations 
between countries and, consequently, the Government of the 
United States recognises that Japan has special interests in
China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are
26contiguous (Manchuria]." But the United States and Japan 
interpreted these special rights differently. In August of 
1919 Secretary of state Robert Lansing claimed that the 
special interests that: the U.S. had recognised were not 
t litical but economic. Japanese argued that the United 
States had recognised Japan1s special political rights in
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China. In fact, Ishii Kijuro claimed that if the interests 
which the u.S. had recognised were economic, this would con­
tradict the remainder of the agreement which set forth the
27principles of the Open Door and equal opportunity.
There were also serious racial issues. When Ishii 
visited the United States he had another purpose besides 
attempting to have the United States recognise Japan's special 
interests in China. He also was to achieve an agreement on 
the status of Japanese nationals in the United States. This 
was to be a five point agreement as followss 1) Japan and the 
United States were to accord the other most-favored nation 
treatment as regarded the acquisition, enjoyment, exercise, 
and inheritance of rights; 2) the principle of most-favored 
nation treatment was to govern employment rights; 3) com­
panies and organizations composed either wholly or in part 
of Japanese or U.S. nationals in regards to matters of 
acquisition, enjoyment, and expressing of rights pertaining 
to real estate were to enjoy most-favored nation treatment;
4) the agreement was not to affect existing legislation;
and 5) the Japanese government was to reserve its position
28in regard to the California Land Law. The U.S* did not 
agree to these provisions.
The Japanese attempted to have a provision concerning 
racial equality inserted in the Covenant of the League 
of Nations. Their original proposal, which did not get past 
Colonel House of the Hearlean delegation, stated that "the
-18
High Contracting Parties agree that concerning the treatment 
and rights to be accorded to aliens in their territories# 
they will not discriminate, either in law or in fact# 
against any person on account of his or their race or 
nationality.N Colonel House did approve Japan's proposal B 
by which the powers were to agree to accord equal treatment 
to aliens without making any distinction on account of their 
race or nationality. Japan failed to achieve the insertion 
of this clause in the Charter of the League of Nations 
largely due to the intransigence of Australian Prime Minister 
Hughes. The United States continued to block the flow of 
Japanese immigrants under the terms of the Immigration Law 
of 1907; the Japanese had also agreed to restrict the flow 
of immigrants by the Gentlemen's Agreement of the same year.
To add insult to injury# Californians strengthened the Alien 
Land Law in 1920 by forbidding those persons who had no 
possibility of becoming citizens from purchasing land in the 
names of their children who often were American citizens.
The Japanese government protested these acts in a memorandum 
to the State Dei irtment.
Another post-war controversy was over the island of 
Yap# a major Pacific cable station which was mandated to Japan 
by the Treaty of Versailles along with the other formerly 
German islands north of the equator in the Pacific, The 
American Senate did not approve the treaty; the American 
government maintained that# at the Paris Peace Conference#
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President Wilson had not agreed that these islands were to 
be held in mandate by Japan and reserved the right of 
unlimited access to the use of Yap as a cable relaying sta­
tion* The American press also questioned the motives for 
the existence of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and by the time 
it was set to expire if not renewed, in the summer of 1921, 
it had become a controversial issue* Moreover the American 
Senate's failure to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, which 
allowed the American government to oppose post-war Japanese 
policies which other powers had already recognised, was 
viewed as a lack of sincerity by America in honoring her 
international commitments*
Disputes and the Possibility of War 
With the expansion of the American and Japanese 
fleets, the controversies over Yap, Shantung/ the Anglo* 
Japanese Alliance, the Siberian Expedition, and immigration 
disputes, the possibility of an American-Japanese war was 
bandied about in many quarters in both Japan and the United 
States. In 1917 the Imperial Japanese Wavy formally adopted 
the policy of viewing the United States as its most likely 
enemy. In the view of Admiral Kato war might be possible 
because of 1) the Monroe Doctrine, 2) restrictive immigration 
policy, 3) the Open Door policy in China, 4) opposition to 
Japanese possessions in the South Seas, and 5) continued
■ji
naval expansion* The U.S* Navy in the immediate post-war 
period considered adopting Japan as its most likely enemy and
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the advocates of a big navy in Congress did not hesitate to 
paint a dire picture of the result of a clash between the 
two nations. There was a conflict within the American navy 
over which nation, Great Britain or Japan, loaned larger as 
a potential enemy. The General Board feared the dominance 
of the navy of Great Britain. Chief of Naval Operations 
Benson agreed that even though strength equal to that of 
Great Britain would overwhelm Japan, since Britain was his­
torically more aggressive in trade and naval competition 
than Japan, the strength of Britain had to be matched. The 
Blaus Division of the u.S. Navy determined by autumn of 1919 
that Japan was the most likely enemy of the United States and 
worked out a three-stage battle plan of seising and strength­
ening islands in the Eastern Pacific, moving on the Philip­
pines through the mandated islands, and than stranfling Japan.
Many officers of the General Board disagreed with this plan
32as they thought it a threat to their authority.
In his book Sea Power in the Pacific published in 
1921 before the Washington Conference# Hector C. Bywater# an 
associate of the Institute of Naval Architecture# compared 
the strengths of the American and Japanese fleets and the 
possible strategies and results in the event of a conflicts 
Bywater maintained that Japan could easily seise the Philip* 
pines and Guam in two weeks# long before the American 
Pacific fleet could be brought across the ocean* The perma­
nent Asiatic Fleet of the U.S. in February of 1921 consisted
21
of three cruisers of obsolete design, eight patrol vessels,
13 destroyers, and 10 auxiliaries. Eighteen destroyers were 
on the way there. This fleet could easily have been 
destroyed by the Japanese Navy. However, the O.S. Fleet, 
which included 19 dreadnoughts 1 had nuch greater firepower 
than that of Japan. 7hu main battle line of the Japanese 
fleet consisted of six dreadnought battleships and four 
battle cruisers. Two of these battleships were of post-
34Jutland design. To American naval strategists the Philip­
pines would be relatively easy to seise due to the inadequacy 
of their fortification. Fortifications had been improved 
significantly around Manila Bay and in 1920 some twenty 
destroyers, twenty submarines, and four kite balloons were 
based there. Yet Congress refused to appropriate the funds 
necessary to move the dry dock Dewey and in the view of an 
Arne, ican naval officert
The Philippines are there for Japan whenever she likes 
to take them, and nothing can prevent her from seising 
them when she feels to do so. As at present circum­
stances, we could do nothing whatsoever to protect them 
in time of war . .
The U.S. did not appear to have the capability to 
defeat Japan in a short war in the Western Pacific. The 
actual empire defenses were virtually unassailable. Japan 
was invulnerable from the Sea of Japan side; the straits of 
Shimonoseki and the northern entranoe to the Sea of Japan 
could be easily blocked. The only part of the empire which 
was vulnerable to an American attack was Formosa, where
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Japan obtained a large rice orop, coal, and copper. Tha 
Japaneee plan was to engage the U.S. battle fleet after it 
croaeed the Pacific. But the American fleet would not have 
aufficient auxiliary craft to eerve tha needs of the fleet 
operating at such a long distance from its bases. The 
Japanese navy would hold four distinct advantages in such a 
conflicts 1) it would fight at no great distance from its 
bases with its ships at their maximum fighting efficiency, 
that is, their hulls would be free of fouling so an to 
maximise their speed and the supply lines would be short and 
secures 2) it could use all of its serviceable heavy ships, 
cruisers, and destroyers while the u.S. could only bring a 
portion of its destroyers; 3) its four battlecruisers of the 
Kongo olass would be at least 6 knots faster than the American 
battleships, as the U.S. did not expect to complete any 
battlecruisers before lid3; and 4) it would have a large man* 
bar of submarines available for uee. Though the United States 
could bring much greater firepower to bear than Japan, tha 
Japanese could use their speed to avoid a fight to the fin­
ish and a materially indsciaive battle would confirm tha 
Japanese fleet's mastery of the Western Pacific.
The United States could, by fortifying Guam, make 
itself capable of defeating Japan in a fairly short war* If 
Guam were properly fortified and dredged it would be impos­
sible to attack and a fleet sent across the Pacific could be 
based there. From Guam the recapture of the Philippines
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would be relatively easy, and from baaas in tha Philippines 
tha Unitad States could make sporadic attacks on tha Japa­
nese coast, blockade Japan, nnd affectively force its sur-
37render. Of course in a prolonged war there was no question 
of the ability of the United States to create such an over­
whelming preponderance of naval strength as to be able to 
defeat Japan. This idea was the basis of the strategy 
adopted by the Plans Division of the U.8. Navy. In light 
of the tradeoffs made at the Washington Conference, Bywater's 
view of the strategic importance of the fortifications of 
bases in the Western Paoifie is most interesting. Bywater's 
opinion on the outcome of war between America and Japan was 
shared by Admiral Kato and Captain Misuno, a naval propa­
gandist, who stated in an article in the Chaaai Ihocvo in 
late 1921, that war with America would be futile even though 
Japan could possibly win in the short run. He stated that 
sines America could not be really defeated, such a war would 
continue for a long time, and Japan would not improve her 
position. Also, if Japan were to lose she would probably lose
possession of Taiwan and have her conmnmioetions with the rest
38of the world cut.
Between the conclusion of the armistice in November 
of 1918 and the issue of invitations to the Washington Con­
ference the United States engaged in a number of naval 
actions which affected Japanese imagery* In 1919 the United 
States split its fleet into two of squadrons of equal
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strength , one in the Atlantis and one in the Pacific.** in 
1921 four of ttaa moat powerful new oil-burning ships of the 
American navy wara placed in the Pacific Fleet, which was 
stationed on tha M a t  Coast of tha United States. M s  
government examined and spent money on bases on the Ptteifie 
Coast to enable them to serve as bases for the American 
fleet. Yet from 1919 to 1921 the congress voted no funds 
for building bsyond the completion of previously authorised 
programsi except for funds provided in 1919 for naval avia­
tion. It authorised no new combat ships between November of 
1918 and the Washington Conference, and tike ships whioh had 
been authorised ware being completed only very slowly due to 
the lack of funding by tha Congress.
in January 1911 only one of the ton battleships author­
ised book in 1914 was approadMaf completion) only 
three were as much ap so psrmsnt along) six was* less 
than 20 percent, the battlecruisers were still less .. 
advanced, ranging from 1 to 11 percent of completion.
Nonetheless the aoney spent on construction was still sub­
stantial. m  1920 the navy spent $170,000,000, including 
$49,000,000 for battleships, battleoruissrs, and soout 
cruisers, and in 1921, the Congress appropriated a total of 
$155,896,383.96, including $100,471,869.99 for the above 
mentioned categories.
The navy was quite interested in fortifying Guam, tha 
Philippines, and Pearl Harbor, A navy board of inspection 
went to Pearl Harbor in 1919 and concluded that its dock, 
repair, and magasines were totally insufficient for the
25
needs of the Pacific float in tina of paaea "and, of course, 
totally inadaquata to taka cara of tha whola Plaet in any 
movement, offanaiva or dafanaive, across tha Pacific." it 
could provide anchorage for only three capital ahips, eight 
acout cruiaera, and thirty-one deatroyera. The board pro­
posed the following to be completed within 5 yearat tha 
eonatruction of two concrete piera, one 1800 and ona 1000 
feet long, tha erection of large foundriea, machine and 
hollar shops, magazines, oil fuel depots, and harbor rail­
ways, the creation of complete air and submarine bases, and 
the dredging of an area to provide anchorage for eight
42battleships. In 1921 $890,000 was appropriated for work 
on Pearl Harbor. During the same year, the navy requested 
$1,499,000 for the fortification of Guam, Yet Congress 
appropriated no money for this fortification, as they did 
every time that the navy requested money for Guam from 
November 1918 through the Washington Conference. ***
The American navy in 1921 was quite powerful. It
included 17 battleships of the first line, 6 of the second
line, 8 armored cruisers, 4 first class cruisers, 4 second
class cruisers, 14 third class cruisers, 298 destroyers, and
87 submarines, but it was undermanned. Its authorised
strength was 160,000 men but the actual total was 20,000 to
30,000 less ti n this, partially due to the relatively low 
44wages.
In Japan, Hare made good on his pledge to expand the 
fleet. The Diet passed his 1920 budget in Julyi the budget
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included 9398,611,530, approximately 1290,006,000 In 1921 
dollars, for naval expansion to get ths 8-8 program underway. 
One hendrad end three ships wore to he canstrueted including 
4 battleships, 4 battlecruisers, 12 cruisers, 5 gunboats, 22 
destroyers, 28 submarines, 2 aircraft carriers, and 6 feet
4$tankers. In 1921 Mara's budget once again included vast 
sums for the expansion of the navy. In its original form 
the total budget was ¥1,562,000,000 and was approved by a 
vote of 266 to 152 on February 12, 1921 by the bower Muse of 
the Diet. On March 5 the government presented a second 
additional budget request of 960,000,000 of which the army 
and navy were to receive 949,171,990 the navy requesting 
97,066,705 for extraordinary expenses and 92,919,075 for 
ordinary expenses. The government explained that tilt need 
for more money was due to the vising cost of naaufaeturiaf 
war vessels. The bower House approved this requost on the 
eighth. Tsuhara Takeshi of the Kanseikai, the main opposi­
tion party, expressad fear at ths increasing needs of ths 
navy. He felt that the requests for naval expenditures 
indicated that the navy would take up an increasing share of 
the budget in the future. The House of Peers approved the 
budget in its final form on Maroh 23; a total of 9762,060,600 
was appropriated to the military, 9273,000,000 of which was 
to go to the continuation of the 8-8 program.
The government expressed both its fear of naval 
expansion and desire for disarmament from the very beginning
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of 1921. Baron Hayaahl, the Japanese anbaaaador to Great
Britain, said in an interview in January 1921 that Japan
hoped to atop the threatened naval race in the Pacific,
explained Japanese fears of the United States, and spoke of
Japan's own harmless motives.
How could we [sic] a fleet only half the sise of the 
American fleet cherish aggressive designs against the 
United States? The United States has no aggressive 
designs any more than we have, but they are building a 
fleet so powerful that it will relegate all others to 
the position of mere ciphers, enabling America to dic­
tate her conception of justice. Political exigencies 
and national dignity alike demand that as a naval power 
we shall not oonsent to place ourselves at the total 
mercy of another fleet.
Since Japan this year will spend £70,000,000 on her navy and 
the U.S. proposes to spend around £200,000,000 ". . . the 
ratio of superiority of the American fleet over the Japanese 
fleet is . . . incomparably higher than that of the British 
over the Gorman fleet in 1914.1,47 Other politicians outside 
of the government also feared the American plans. Marquis 
5kuma Shigenobu, Prime Minister of Japan from 1914 to 1916, 
characterized the American naval buildup as aggressive and 
thought it was necessary for the U.S. and Great Britain to 
reach an agreement on disarmament first and then only would 
Japan be able to follow the other powers' lead in disarma­
ment, since her weapons were defensive. 8
Japanese naval views of American expansionism in the 
immediate post-war years were tempered by a desire to know 
the facts of American plans. In the spring of 1919 both the 
General Staff and the Navy Ministry agreed that Japan's
-28
position had deteriorated as a result of the war. Both 
Graftt Britain and the United States had expanded their fleets 
and if their ongoing expansion plans were completed the 
relative position of the Japanese Fleet would only deterior­
ate further. The Navy Ministry received reports of the 
improvement of American Pacific coast bases but Admiral Xat5 
was not completely sure of American intentions, except he
did believe that the U.S. would complete its 1916 building 
49program. Throughout the year of 1921 when the cry for 
disarmament reached a fever pitch, and while there was the 
inauguration of a new president in the U.S., the Japanese 
navy tried to make its position known through articles aad 
interviews in the press. Concerning the naval buildup of 
the United States, oertain officers pointed out that it most 
assuredly was being undertaken with Japan as a possible 
enemy and that as long as this buildup went on Japan would 
continue to build vessels in defense. According to Captain 
Misuno,
The situation between Japan and America today is like 
that which existed between England and Germany before 
the World War. Not contenting herself with her power­
ful navy, America is contemplating a program, the 
realisation of which wou.M place her in a position 
infinitely superior to Japan in naval power.
To another officer the completion of the American naval pro-
BAgram would result in war.
Many members of the press and the navy viewed the 
American naval buildup as a justification for the completion 
of the 8-8 fleet; the navy also presented a different
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justification for the completion of the plan* In order for 
the former justification to exist, in the view of the Japan 
Advertiser, the American daily in Japan, the superiority of 
the American fleet in fv.ture years had to be proven* The 
Japan Advertiser challenged the position that the American 
fleet would be superior in the future in a series of articles 
in March of 1921. It presented and refuted the arguments 
which Japanese government officials and naval officers made 
for the completion of the 8-8 plan. The ideas of Japan's 
leaders were presented quite succinctly at least as those 
stood prior to Baron KatO's March 24 statement that the 8-8 
plan was negotiable*
Whatever agreement for the limitation Of armaments 
is entered into, Japan must be allowed to complete her 
eight-eight program*
This eight-eight program is an old scheme of naval 
expansion, for defense only, demanded by the nteessity 
of protecting the ocifn borne commerce of Japan and 
the
Japa ^  TOWer
even though the United itates completes only the expan­
sion program of 19li*51
The Advertiser challenged all the points of the 
Japanese arguaents. First it refuted the contention that 
the American navy would be materially superior to the Japa­
nese navy upon the completion of the 8-8 plan in 1928* It 
argued in the following way* The Nagato was the only bat­
tleship completed by 1921 considered a part of the 8-8 plan. 
The Mutsu was almost complete and due to be commissioned in 
1921* In 1928 Japan would have 16 post-Jutland capital
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ships eight of which would have been designed after 1922 
when the last ships of the American 1916 building plan were 
to have been designed. The United States would have II 
post-Jutland capital ships, in 1928, but eight of the 
Japanese ships, since they were to be designed later, would 
probably be more powerful than any ships in the United States 
Fleet.
The Advertiser refuted the argument that Japan needed 
the fleet to protect her trade. Since America's national 
income was approximately eight times that of Japan, if she 
were to spend the same proportion of that income on her 
naval forces as Japan did on its naval forces she would build 
a 64-64 fleet. American foreign trade was six times greater 
than that of Japan so America would need a 48-48 fleet on 
that basis. The Advertiser stated that in real terms Japan 
was spending twice as much on it: navy as Germany spent in 
1914-1915, the years of its greatest war preparations. The 
paper pointed that in real terms Japan in 1921-1922 was to 
spend ¥319,000,000 on naval building, the United States 
¥180,000,000 and Orest Britain ¥121,000,000. Japan was to 
spend 731 more on construction than the United States, (of 
course this ignored the fact that the American appropria­
tions were not near enough to complete its authorised build­
ing plan.) The Advertiser maintained that in ships already 
authorised in 1921, by 1928 the actual first line fighting 
strength of the two navies would be as follows, assuming
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that the length of service of a ship in the first line was
52eight years.
America Japan
Battleships 12 8
Battlecruisers 6 8
Light Cruisers 10 20
Destroyers 120 85
Submarines 60 80
The Japanese navy responded to these charges of the
Advertiser through an article written in refutation by
Captain Hidaka Kinji, a navel publicist, and published
originally in the Tokyo Asahi and the Tokyo Jijj and in
translation in the Japan Advertiser. Captain Hidaka
explained the purpose of writing this refutation.
These articles [the Japan Advertiser articles] were 
clearly written as propaganda. Intelligent Japanese 
readers, 1 firmly trust, will not be misled by such 
propaganda and begin to doubt the defense plan on 
which our country has decided. But even rain drops, 
dropping from the eaves may wear a hole in a stone.
Unable to remain silent because of my patriotism, I 
have decided to write this article in order to point 
out the mistakes of that paper and at the same time 
to ask for reader's criticism.53
The Captain did not choose to refute the author of the Japan 
Advertiser articles point by point. He explained tha way in 
which the plan to construct the 8-8 fleet had barn determined 
why its construction was still necessary, and the misunder­
standing of naval strategy by the Advertiser. Once he
proved that the 8-8 fleet was necessary for tha defense of
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the empire, he believed that Japanese would support the 
program whatever the cost.
The eight-eight program was planned by our navy 
immediately after the Russo-Japanese War, but the 
underlying ideas of it had been conceived long before 
that. When the Sino-Japanese Mur was over, Russia, 
joined by Germany and France menaced our country t>y 
means of her powerful fleet, thereby depriving our 
country of the fruits of victory. . . . Then Russia 
seized the Liaotung Peninsula, overran Manchuria and 
her evil hand threatened to stretch out to Korea.
Our northern frontiers were seriously menaced. There­
upon, our naval authorities . . . decided upon a modest 
plan sufficient . . .  to repulse an enemy in the 
neighboring seas, assisted by our geographical advan­
tage, not intent upon taking the offensive, because 
we had no such power at our command. For that purpose 
it was deemed sufficient only if the newest and best 
unit from the strategical point of view was coexisted. 
The six-six unit plan which we had at the time of the 
Russian war was then decided on. The eight-eight plan 
of today was born of the same ideas that produced the 
six-six plan.
He wrote that the lessons of the Russo-Japanese War and the 
development of naval technology provided that a unit of
54eight capital ships was the most efficient fighting unit.
To him the 8-8 fleet was necessary to defend the
trade of Japan. The argument that America's fleet should be
larger than the Japanese fleet in the same ratio as the
volume of American trade to Japanese trade was without merit.
There have been examples without number in history of 
attaching war vessels to a merchant fleet of a certain 
number as a convoy in order to protect commerce. But 
that plan invariably has been a failure.55
Admiral Mahan, whose doctrines dominated the strategic think­
ing of the American navy, taught that the best method of 
protecting commerce either was to destroy the other fleet 
or bottle it up and obtain command of the seas. Convoys
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protected by cruisers were used effectively in the Greet 
War but only as protection from submarines# against capital 
ships they would be useless. Japan was import-dependent 
especially in foodstuffs. "The greater portion of food­
stuffs imported is rice and other grains# the staple foods
56of the people. Raw materials such as cotton# rubber# 
petroleum# and iron were also imported. Since Japan 
imported these goods from Annam, Burma# China# the Dutch 
East Indies# Formosa# India# Korea# and the United States 
it was necessary that the sea power in the area east of 
the Indian Ocean# the Western Pacific# and the South Seas 
be controlled.
The area of these seas is very extensive and the routes 
of trade cross each another [sic]. Consequently# one 
unit of eight-eight is not sufficient to control these 
seas effectively. Much less would it be effective if 
the unit were smaller than that.57
To this naval publicist the 8-8 plan was indispens­
able to the very existence of the Japanese Empire. He 
learned the lessons of international existence from the 
Triple Interventions if Japan were to claim her rights in 
East Asia merely being in the just position was insufficient# 
it was necessary to safeguard those rights with military 
power to which the nations of the West would yield and which 
was a legitimate means of furthering the national interest*
He was convinced of the support of the Japanese public as 
long as it could be proven that the 8-8 plan was necessary 
to safeguard the security of the empire.
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Japanese government officials did support tha oomple- 
tion of tha 8-8 float just as the Japan Advertiser assarted. 
Baron Hayaohi declared on December 29, 1920 that Japan had 
to complete her 8-8 plan and that even then she would only 
have half of the naval strength of A B M r i c a . H a r a  Kei in an
interview which was in complete agreement with the later 
statements made by the naval publicist stated that the t-8 
plan was an old program and that its purpose . . is to 
defend our coasts and commerce nothing more. Our experts 
have decided that our present sea foroe is insufficient for 
this. Hence we must keep building."*9 Viscount KatB Takaaki, 
the leader of the opposition Kokuminto, said he was in favor 
of disarmament but "Japan's program of eight and eight* 
which is purely defensive should be exempted if Great Bri­
tain, the United States and Japan agree to limit naval ana* 
ments."®® Baron Sakamoto Toshiatsu, a member of the House of 
Peers, compared the 8-8 plan to tha two swords of the samurait
. . . the plan of the eight and eight fleet ought to 
have bean proeeeded with long agoi it is an indis­
pensable attribute of the national existance of Japan 
just like the two swords of samurai. England and the 
United States have more than one pair of the indis­
pensable swords of samurai,and yet they want Japan to 
part with the neeessaries.81
one more oft-expressed justification for the comple­
tion of the 8-8 fleet was the detrimental effeot which a 
stoppage in shipbuilding would have on the naval yards and 
the capacity for Japan to build in the future. Admiral Sato 
Testutaro, the commandant of the Maidsuru Naval Station*
- 35-
folloved Otski Yukio, tho disarmament advocate, in speaking 
to 1000 people at a tally in Kobe. He explained the need 
for building ships:
30 hi« «t*Ihi|>a Ontil Japan increaeei extant that aha oan heap pace with Japan mist keep on building at normal
of turning out 
, 30 and America 
ay Inals lor 
ica for 16.
,ding to an 
of these two
Usages and Positions
The Japanese press was both vary interested in and 
afraid of American naval policies frost 1919 to 1921,* The 
ary for dlaarmincnt in the Japanese press finally grew to a 
fever pitch after the introduction of the Borah resolution 
in the U.S. Senate in late 1920. This oalled for a reduc­
tion of 50% in the naval building prograsts of tee aajor 
powers and requested the President to call a disarmament 
conference. ”  The press reported the movements of the 
American fleet. Attitudes toward the armaments race were 
colored by fear, fear of the power of the U.8. steaming from 
a lack of confidence in the benevolence of America, fear of 
the expenditures necessary to maintain the Japanese fleet at 
a level capable of defending tee empire in light of the huge 
projected buildup of the American fleet under the 191C plan, 
fear of the resulting tax increases, and of neglect of other
"The articles and editorials from Japanese language 
newspapers and periodicals were translated in the English 
language Japanese dailies. Each day tea main editorials from 
the major Japaneee dailies ware published in translation.
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areas of need such as education, which would ba oausad by tha 
buildup, and faar of being shut into tha home islands of 
Japan with neither an outlat for a burgeoning population nor 
markets for exports. Vhn motivation for disermment was 
thus twofold. Tha first motivation was tha fear of war 
resulting from an armaments race--to moot people this m s  
tha lesson to be learned from the naval raee of Qreat Britain 
and Germany. They ramambarod ths carnage and destruction of 
the war, at least as they experienced it viaariously, and 
were determined to avoid it. Secondly there was a desire to 
out expenditures. The too services hy 1911 ware absorbing 
half of all government spending and the completion of the 
t-8 fleet along with ths subsequent army expansion were to 
keep defense spending very high for a long time to ocmn.
American naval programs were considered unjustifi­
able, particularly in light of the lessons of the war. 
According to the Hoohi the American building plans placed 
America in tha same place as Germany before the war. Tha 
Yorodiu compared President Wilson to Kaiser Wilhelm, "who was 
generally regarded as the incarnation of militarism, and yet 
spoke of Pacifism for nearly thirty years after his aooas- 
sion, thus concealing his real ambitions. There was a 
tendency among some papers to listen to what Americans, par­
ticularly Secretary of the Navy Daniels, were saying. They 
tended to believe the espoused plans of American naval offi­
cers rather than the actual appropriations made by the
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Congress. The editors of these papers did not trust the 
United States and believed the worst. They did not dig deep 
enough to find out thet the Congress was not appropriating 
funds for any new naval construction.
In November of 1920 Harding was elected President. 
During the period when Wilson was a lame du ^resident 
Daniels presented to Congress a $390,000,0QQ plan to con­
struct a total of ft vessels which would include two battle­
ships, one battlecruiser, and 4i cruisers. Daniels stated 
during this session that America needed the largest navy in 
the world because she had the longest coastline in the world. 
This has been interpreted as a ploy to influence the Senate 
to vote for the entry of the United States into the league of
Nations but it was not perceived so benignly by some masters
asof the Japanese press. The Kokusai Associated Press 
reported the expansionist statements of people such as Admiral 
Sims who declared that the United States must have the most 
powerful navy in the world before disarmament begins. The 
Berodsu, the the offra Niohi, the ChttQ. and
the g&gjjjri all wrote editoriels questioning the naval 
assanslon programs of the United Statea.** The Yorodso wrote 
that America was M. , . dragging other countrie« into araa- 
ment competition1' and that though the United States espoused 
a desire for disarmament there was an Amsrican naed to "have 
a navy large enough to break up an allied navy and thia 
alliance must not be anything elsa than the Anglo-Japanese
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Alliance.1,67 The Yorodiu choae to ignore the fact that ndval 
expansion was not faring well in the Congress in the spring 
of 1921. The House passed an appropriations bill to which 
the Naval Committee of the Senate added $100,000,000 la 
additional funds including money for a base on ^uam.*8 The 
Yorodau predicted that the amended plan was likely to be 
passed by the Senate thus proving that the advocates of dis- 
armasMnt in America were in a small minority and that "America 
has no qualification to propose disarmament."88 The Yorodan 
ignored the fact that these increased estimates were laker 
rejected by the House and the fact that any spending M i l  
amended by the Senate had to be approved by the Bouse.
The Ysmiuri claimed that America ”. . .  is the way­
ward child of the world. While she defends the Western 
Hemisphere under the banner of Monroeism she assaults the 
rest of the world with her capitalism and a navy which she 
claims is the world's greatest."70 Even before the 1919 and 
later building plans of Secretary Daniels, Japanese feared 
the 1916 building plan, which had been designed to give the 
United States a navy second to none. The Kokumin felt that 
America was hypocritical in proposing disarmament, that is, 
she had no right to present the Borah resolution while at 
the same time continuing her 1916 building plan.7*' While 
the Hlohl Mlohi felt that the United States would destroy by 
its naval policies and restrictive immigration program the 
goodwill which Japanese had felt for America for fifty years.72
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The Chuo, which was the government organ, had one of the moat 
warped perceptions of American plans, ft editorialised that 
America had no right to call Japan ailitaristic for spending 
9dt of her budget on the military bamsuse America was "devot-
73ing 90 percent of her revenue to military expenditures."
The Japanese press image of American naval policies 
improved during the course of 1921. This coincided with the 
invitation to tile disarmament conference issued during the 
summer of that year. The attitudes expressed early in 1921 
fay the Jiji and the foreshadowed the line whiah
the majority took later in the year.74 The Ji1i and the 
Tokyo Asahi took a more detailed look at the actual programs 
enacted by the American government. This attitude can best 
be paraphrased as follows. The American building program is 
reactionary and Ignores the lessons of the Oreat War. The 
influence of expansionists can be seen in the appropriations 
added by the Senate Naval Committee to the house naval appro­
priation bill. Tot there is still hope for disarmament.
Th>* Senate did pass the Borah resolution. The American people 
are peace-loving as is shown in their newspapers. It is 
necessary to ignore the voices of expansionists such as 
Secretary Daniels and use the pro-disarmament feelings to 
facilitate peace between Japan and the United States. If 
America agrees to limit its building program, a disarmament 
agreement can be reached. The Hochi even recognised that 
the Bouse curtailed the naval expenditures approved by the
Senate and stated that "Americans seemingly have wakened 
from the folly of indiscriminately maintaining their policy
of militant offensiveness which has characterised their
75national attitude in recent years."
The press followed the movements of the American 
fleet and American strategic programs. Xt was rumored in 
January of 1921 that the United States and Canada were dis­
cussing the joint patrol of the Pacific. Although Daniels
on January 5 denied the report, the damage had already been
76done. Once again the press perceived the United States to 
be pursuing an aggressive policy in the Pacific. During 
March it was reported that the United States had decided to 
concentrate its fleet in the Pacific. Although the report 
was not yet substantiated by March 20# the Kokumin had no 
doubt that the report was true as it believed that American 
ambitions lay in the Par East# and all naval officers sub­
scribed to the theories of Admiral Mahan. To the Kokumln 
the concentration would show American aggressiveness and 
seriously wound the feelings of the Japanese people. The
Yomiurl also warned that Japan should pay serious attention
77to the concentration of the fleet in the Pacific.
The most threatening of all American naval actions 
were the fortification and expansion of bases on the Pacific 
Coast of the United States# at Pearl Harbor# at Guam# and in 
the Philippines. To nearly all members of the press the only 
possible reason for such fortification was preparation for a
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war with Japan. The United States did expend funds on Nest 
Coast bases and Pearl Harbor but money was not spent on Guam 
nor on the Philippines. There were only 173 Narines sta­
tioned on Guam but the Marine Corps had through the reallo­
cation of material slightly improved Guam's defenses. Still
7®it could not serve as a base for the Pacific fleet. The 
Japanese press reacted to the fact that money was being spent 
on the Neat Coast and Hawaii and reacted as if money were 
being spent to fortify Guam and the Philippines into naval 
bases. To the Osaka Malnlchi. the Osaka Asahi. the Tokyo 
Mlohl Mlohl. the Jijl, and the Yomluxi, the United States was 
hastening to completion great naval bases in the Philippines 
and Guam. The editorial contained in the Hay 23 Tokyo Mlohl 
Hlohl is most representative of this attitude. The paper 
stated that
as a matter of fact. America is hastening the completion 
of fortifications at Hawaii, the Philippines, and Guam 
and is enlarging her fleet. What does all this mean?
The day of a psychological menace is past? it is now 
the day of a concrete menace.79
The "concrete menace” of fortifications in Guam and the
80Philippines was a figment of the imagination of the press.
After the proposal of the Hashington conference the 
J H 1  Shining, the Japan Times, and a Kokuaai Associated press 
staff reporter agreed that the removal of fortifications in 
the Pacific on both the Japanese and American sides was a 
prerequisite for the achievement of a disarmament agreement. 
The Xokusai staff reporter proposed that the United States
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grant the Philippine* independence, thus obviating tile heed 
for the fortification of Guam and removing tha threat to 
Japan.83, The Jljl doubted that an agreement With such an 
aggreasive country even if it were concluded would endure. 
Even the editorial staff at the Japan Time*, which had been 
owned by an American named J. Russell Kennedy until being 
sold to a Japanese group on August 16* 1921, feared the 
establishment of an American naval base at Guam. The Japan 
Tines recognized however that there was no strategically sig­
nificant base on Guam already. "A naval base at Guam . . .
would offer a substantial menace to this country and call
83for counter-measures of defense."
The fate of the Anglo-Japansse Alliance meant a groat 
deal to the security of the Japanese Empire and the measures 
necessary to enable Japan to defend its rights and interests 
in Asia, in December of 1920 the British government pub­
licly assured the United States that since it had concluded 
the Peace Commission Treaty with the United States in 1914, 
although such a treaty was generally not considered to be a 
general arbitration agreement, the British government con­
sidered it to fulfill the terms of Article 4 of the Anglo- 
Japanese Alliance and thus the U.S. was not a target of the 
alliance. The Ambassador to Great Britain Hayashi explained 
in the January 4, 1921 Times of London that the
United States has never been thought of by the con­
tracting parties as a country which would ever take 
or contemplate taking any action likely to threaten
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their territorial rights or specie1 interests in the 
Far Bast.
It was* therefore never in the mind.of the Japanese 
government to fight the United States.84
Japanese Foreign Minister Uchida Yasuya reiterated this poll*
tion in his address to the opening session of the Diet in
February of 1921 and the Japanese Ambassador to the United
States, Shidehara Kijuro, quoted the Diet statement of
Uohida in a statement in the Mew York Times of July 4. the
government consistently maintained this position throughout
1921. The government, which desired to renew the alliance,
sought to calm the fears of Americans in order to have the
alliance renewed. They realised the increasing harmony of
Anglo-American relations and did not wish to have their
i;interests in East Asia jeopardised because of it.
The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was due to expire during 
the sumner of 1921 and was discussed in July in London at 
the Imperial Conference at which all the Dominions of the 
British Empire were represented. The Japanese press reaction 
to the pending expiration of the alliance and the revelation 
that America was not and had not been a target of the alli­
ance for several years was quite mixed. The Y«— urged 
that the Diet seek information on the Anglo-Japanese Alli- 
ance. It believed that it was not justifiable that neither 
the British nor the Japanese governments had announced the 
fact that the Britisn had given notification in 1914 that 
they would not fight America.8* There were three basic
positions taken in ths press. The most accommodating toward 
the American point of view was that taken by the Osaka 
which urged the abrogation of the alliance in order to alle­
viate American suspicion. It stated that since Britain 
would not help Japan anyway in a war and "it is perceived by 
Americans that she could be attacked under it (the Anglo- 
Japanese Alliance] it's best to abrogate and negotiate 
openly for naval arms reduction."87 The Tokyo Hiohi Hiohi. 
the Yorodsu, the Tokyo Asahi. the Kokasln, and the Boohl all 
urged renewal of the alliance even if the United States wero 
not a target. In general they felt that the alliance had 
served its purpose in maintaining the peace of Bast Asia* 
was not in conflict with the spirit of the League because it 
preserved peace* and would not only strengthen Buropean- 
Japanese friendship but as the Yanato asserted could and
I*should become the pivot for American-Japanese friendship.
Ths third position taken concerning the alliance was that it 
should be replaced with an entente among Japan* Britain* and 
the United States. This position was subscribed to by the 
Chuo. the Osaka Mainiohi. and the Chucai Shoayo. The 
Chuaai Shocvo maintained that an entente among the three powers 
taking the Paoific problems as its objective would success-
fl|fully solve the problem of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance,
The controversy over the alliance fissled out during the year 
of 1921 particularly as the prospects for the successful start 
of a disarmament conference became brighter and brighter.
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The Tokyo Michi Niohi, the ’""fey* *■**»* - the Yorodsu, 
the Hochi, the Ycmiuri, and the Ji1i all oread during the 
first half of 1921 that Japan psrtieipete in a disarmament 
conference and that aha accept diaarmanant in principle.
They aupportad the idea that ainoa the naval strength of a 
nation waa relative, if the United Stataa vara willing to 
deereaae ita naval building it would be poaaibla for Japan 
to dacraaae ita naval program. The 8-8 plan waa not 
immutable in their eyaa. The Yomiuri recognised the prin­
ciple of diaarmament but found it difficult to believe an 
agreement could be concluded. Zt felt that if Senator 
Borah'a proposal were undertaken and all the powers limited 
their building plans by 50%. the relative strength of the 
navies would remain unchanged and for Japan to do this when 
she had yet to complete one single fighting unit of the 8-8 
plan would be very painful. The only way for diaarmament to 
be a success was for the powers to "diplomatically solve all 
disputes which may possibly cause war and . , . establish 
the foundation of international peace.
The belief that naval atrength was relative, which 
made the acceptance of a disarmament conference possible, 
also implied that so long as the United States expanded its 
fleet it was necessary for Japan to do so as well. The 
Chngal Shogyo was willing to accept a proposal whereby the 
United States would cease construction after completing her 
1916 program and Japan would oeese construction after
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completing her 8-8 plan. The position* taken by the Osaka 
Aaahl and the Jili neatly outline the reverse sides of the 
sane thinking. The Aaahl stated that Japan was feeling 
menaced at sea and therefore it needed to concentrate on 
its naval armaments. But it had two doubts about the naval 
programt 1) it doubted whether the funds appropriated by 
the Diet would be enough to complete the 8-8 program and
2) it doubted that the navy program was not behind the times 
when compared to the programs of the other powers. The Jill 
on the other hand looked favorably upon the success of the 
Borah resolution and maintained that the 8-8 program could 
be altered if a suitable agreement were reached with America 
and Britain.91
Such a suitable agreement would allow naval expendi­
tures to be decreased. These in 1921 were to consume 32% 
of total national expenditures while over 50% of the budget 
was earmarked for the military in general. The desire for 
disarmament, particularly because of a desire to decrease 
expenditures on non-productive goods, was embodied in the 
resolution which Osaki Yukio introduced into the Diet in 
February of 1921. He called for Japan to take the lead by 
proposing a disarmament conference. Osaki, who was a former 
Minister of Justice and former member of the Kenseikai, from 
which he was expelled, saw two reasons why Japan should 
either initiate a disarmament proposal or accept one if it 
were reoeived. First, Japan spent too much money on the
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military, which resulted in the neglect of other areas, For 
example, "even by adopting a system of double shift# the 
public schools cannot accommodate the children of school 
age." Also# since America was spending only 14% of her 
budget on the navy while Japan was spending 321 of hers# and 
in absolute terms America was still spending more than Japan# 
the strategic position of Japan could only deteriorate. 2
The resolution was defeated by a vote of 225 to 38 in the
93Lower House of the Diet on February 11. To the Japan 
Advertiser this defeat was not a defeat for disarmament but 
a personal defeat for Ozaki. The Advertiser believed that 
the Seiyukai voted against him because he was their enemy 
and the Kenseikai voted against him because they had recently 
expelled him. Worst of all to the Advertiser, the vote would 
be misinterpreted abroad as a rejection of any desire forQJdisarmament. The interpretation of the Advertiser neg­
lected the statement by Viscount Kato, the leader of the 
Kenseikai that "• • • if Mr Ozaki means that Japan should 
take the lead his proposal loses its greatest value, for 
Japan is not in a position to take the initiative in this
A C  .matter.” Kato was in agreement with the position of the 
government. Baron Hayashi stated that Japan was waiting for 
America or Great Britain to take the lead in proposing dis-
Q£armament.
Ths Jili# the Ycmiurl. the Osaka Asahl, and the Osaka 
Halnlohl, all basically supported the position of Osaki. In
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January the Jill had proposed that Japan take the lead in 
proposing and promoting a plan for disarmament in order to 
decrease the risk of war and lessen the tax hardens of the 
people.97 Therefore when Osaki proposed his resolution the 
Jjji welcomed it.98 The Osaki heahl onoe again earns out 
with the most radical position advocating unilateral dis­
armament since no one knew how mueh the completion and main­
tenance of the 8-8 fleet would cost.99 The Toalurl. the 
Japan Times, and the Osaka Mainlchl all believed that Japan 
needed to disarm because armaments were too expensive. The 
Yoaluri and the Japan Times were the most emphatic in 
describing the choices which Japan had to face. The Yomiurl 
felt that the burden of taxes might cause the Japanese people 
to become Bolshevised and Japan to become another Russia.190 
The Japan Times clearly stated that Japan had a choice of 
more schools or more battleships.101 There were some news­
papers which were in support of the guns side of the argu­
ment. The Tokyo Wiohl Hlchi believed that at times when the 
nation was threatened its defense was more important than any­
thing even if it involved national bankruptcy. It was neces-
102sary that Japan complete the projects already begun. The 
Kokumin and the Chuo also felt that it was useless for Japan 
to take the lead in disarmament when other nations were aug­
menting their armaments at a rapir) pace.103
The business community supported the cause of dis­
armament on the basis that it would help the growth of the
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economy. They recognised the dose end complementary 
economic relationship which Japan had with the United States 
and did not want anything to jeopardise it. In June of 1921 
the Chambers of commsrce of Tokyo. Yokohama, Osaka, Kyoto, 
Kobe, Nagoya, Okayama, and Moji-Shimonoseki, the major 
industrial cities, held a conference in Tokyo. They passed 
a resolution which in part read>
. . .  it is the urgent business of Japan, which has 
always stood for the upholding of justice and humanity 
and the maintenance of peace throughout the world, to 
conclude a proper agreement with the powers regarding 
disarmament so that international peaoe may be guaran­
teed and that more snerav may be devoted to the devel­
opment of industries.104
Even Asano Soichiro, president of the Toyo Xisen Kaisha and
owner of the Asano Shipbuilding Company, who recognised the
loss of business which would accompany a naval disarmament
IDSagreement, came out in favor of such disarmament.
Reactions to the Washington Conference Proposal 
The desire for disarmament also existed in America. 
During the summer of 1921 the American government put out 
feelers to Japan and Great Britain concerning a conference 
on arms limitation and Pacific and Par Eastern questions.
On Monday evening July 11, 1921 the Japanese government 
responded affirmatively in regard to the proposed disarmament 
conference but wished to know the nature and scope of the 
questions to be discussed under the Pacific and Far Eastern 
problems section of the conference. The government desired 
that faits accompli and subjects that were of sole oonoern to
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particular powers not be discussed at the conference, i.e., 
Yap, Shantung, and Japan's special position in Manchuria and 
inner Mongolia* The United States replied to the Japanese 
inquiry that it was impossible for America to define the 
questions to be considered at the meeting because she was 
only a participant and that she felt the topics to be dis­
cussed should be determined by the representatives of the 
powers at the conference. Bell, the American ChargS 
d*Affaires ad interim in Tokyo, asked Foreign Minister 
Uchida not to press the inquiry into the scope of the ques­
tions to ba considered but to accept the invitation uncon­
ditionally; opinions would be exchanged before the con­
ference. Under these terms the Japanese government accepted 
the invitation on July 2 6 . According to the Tokyo Asahi 
the lack of definition of the scope of the conference was in 
the opinion of some Japanese authorities forcing Japan either
to reject the invitation when she really wanted to accept it
107or to make a leap in the diplomatic dark.
Before the beginning of the conference the Japanese 
government attempted to solve those diplomatic issues which 
it did not wish considered at the conference. It made a 
proposal to China in an attempt to settle the Shantung issue 
and during the course of the summer made positive advances 
in negotiations to settle the Yap dispute. The Japanese 
government acceded on a number of points in order to reach a 
settlement. It agreed to the transfer of the ownership of
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the Yap to Guam cable to the United State*, that the United 
States would have froe access to the cables to Guam, that 
American treaties with Japan would apply to Yap, and teat 
American missionaries were free to go there. In exchange 
the American government agreed to recognise that Japan M i d  
the mandate for Yap and the other islands it held as Class C 
Mandates under the terms of the League of Nations.
The balance of Japanese naval opinion came to be in 
favor of arms limitation. The Committee for the Study of 
League of Nations Affairs maintained that Japan should make 
its own disarmament proposals in order to head off the pos­
sibility of having a plan forced on them by the Anglo-Saxon 
powers, in July 1921 the committee reported that since 
Japan18 relative position would only deteriorate if the 
powers continued on their expansion plans, Japan could 
accept a disarmament plan which would stop building after 
the completion of ships under construction, that is, the 
Mutsu, the Amagi, and the Akagi. The only way this was 
possible was if there were a restriction on fortifications 
in the Pacific. The committee pointed out that
the fact that the Imperial Navy today is readily able to 
maintain the national defense against the United States 
Navy depends principally upon the fact that the United 
States has insufficient advanced bases in the Pacific 
and the Far Bast. If . . . th  ^ [Americans] were to 
complete the necessary military facilities • • • our 
strategic relationship would take on a completely new 
aspect. The disadvantages f for] the Empire would most 
certainly be unendurable.103
Thus, the navy went into the conference with no 
timed position on ratios. With Admiral Xato as the chief
delegate and Hara aa Prime Minioter t’iey assumed that what­
ever position was taken could probably ba enforced. However 
on November 4 Hara was struck down by an assassin and 
Takahashi Korekiyo became the new Prime Minister. His con­
trol over political power was nowhere near as secure as that 
of Hara. The navy went in to the conference intending to 
uphold the principle of the freedom of the seas and to limit 
or reduce Pacific fortifications. On November 11, the day 
before the first plenary session of the conference, the 
Japanese delegation gave its official statement to the press.
. . . All the nations of the world with their war 
wounds still sore are clamoring for peace and . . .
Japan, in commonplace with all other countries, is 
demanding relief from the armament burden that threatens 
to strangle her industrial development. Our delegation* 
therefore, is here prepared . . .  to join the other 
nations in any just polioy that may remove misunder­
standing and any progrsmAof anas limitation that assures 
our national security.110
Sven the navy was willing to disarm as long as Japan was not 
threatened by the United States.
The reaction to the American invitation to the con­
ference both in the press and political circles was somewhat 
ambivalent. The reaction to the proposal to discuss dis­
armament was generally positive but the reaction to including 
Pacific and Far Eastern problems within the framework of the 
conference waw negative. The Jiii welooswd the proposal as 
most timely and useful as it believed nothing was more detri­
mental to the maintenance of peace than armament competition. 
The Kokumim, the Yomiuri. and the Yggggg expressed doubts 
over American sincerity and the ability to reaoh a settlement
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of and justification for discussing Far Eastam problems at 
the conference. The Kokumln was particularly distrustful of 
American intentions Since it believedi "The greater portion 
of the existing international complication is due to America's 
dubious attitudes on the decisions made by the Supreme council 
[at the Paris Peace Conference] in which America herself did 
participate.111
in political circles the reaction had the same sort, 
of distinctions. Osaki Yukio welcomed the conference as 
vindicating his position that disarmament was a worldwide 
movement and Baron Sakatani felt that Japan was "destined to 
gain considerable benefit from any international agreement 
designed for the limitation of armament construction.”
Visoount Kabo of the Kenseikai was quoted as weloemlag the 
conference but was doubtful of any agreement as it involved 
so many complicated questions. 12 The business community, 
being so desirous of disarmament, of course welcomed the 
proposed conference. Fujiyama Raita, President of the Tokyo 
Chamber of Commerce, stated that although American naval 
expansion had made the; people nervous if the American pro­
posal were backed up with sincerity it would become unneces-
113sary for Japan to keep up such a large array of warships. 
Immediately before the Washington Conference a group of 
businessmen traveled to the United states on a good will 
visit. Visoount Shibusawa, a leader of this group, expressed 
the belief that Japan desired disarmament beoause its people
were convinced that the "future of their national develop­
ingnent liee entirely along commercial and industrial lines.”
Much of the preaa, politicians, and government offi­
cials believed that Japan was a nation that was misunder­
stood abroad and that if only she were allowed to explain 
her position people everywhere would recognise its justness. 
The Hokum in stated in an editorial that the Pacific Confer­
ence would furnish Japan "with an excellent opportunity to 
explain fully her position to the world and disabuse the 
people of the erroneous nations they entertain about Japan 
and the Japanese.”11  ^ While the Yaaato wrote that the 
powers must regard Japan as a "'Germany of the East* deeply 
wedded to Machiavellian! in her diplomacy and in her inter­
national policy . . . the Coherence will be an excellent
lliopportunity for her to disabuse the world of its errors."
The government also welooeted the Conference in the s u e  way. 
Foreign Minister uchida issued a statement on August 20«
", . . The imperial Government is only too glad that it finds 
in the proposed convention an opportunity of giving expres­
sion to its cherished a La and policy, so as to contribute
117towards the promotion of the cause of peace and humanity.* 
Xnukai Ki, President of the Kokuminto, and Prince Xonoe, who 
later was the Prims Minister three times, welcomed the con­
ference in the same vein. The conference was a ", . , golden
opportunity . . . for removing all foreign misunderstandings
118and misimpressions about Japan. . ."
in line with the position that tho conference was a 
great opportunity to axplain was ths dssirs that Japan ba 
treated as an agual at the conference. Sons were afraid 
that Japan would not be treated equally and that her special 
rights in East Asia would not be recognised. Marquis Skuma 
stated s
. . . Japan should reject any proposal that nay Inpair 
rights legitimately secured in the Far East* with a 
resolution to secede from the Conference if the situ­
ation requires it . . . The most probable fact is 
that having failed to put as much restriction on the 
Japanese position in the Far Bast as she desired at 
the Versailles Conference the United States has sought 
a different opportunity in the form of a Pacific Con­
ference .119
The leaders of the Kenseikai also expressed their fears at 
the possible results of the conference and the subservience 
shown by the government. Taketomi felt that it was very 
regrettable that " . . .  our Government, like one who con­
sults his superior's pleasure, has queried America as to the 
nature of the proposed conference, its scope and the like 
because this is beneath the dignity of the Bopire."*20 
Viscount Kato stated that Japan must insist on justice and 
fairness even at the price of isolation since " . . .  isola­
tion, because of the oause of upholding justice and humanity
121is at once glorious and noble." These leaders were afraid 
of the United states particularly afraid that it would use 
its vast resources to take away those rights for which Japan
had worked so hard and spilled the blood of a hundred thousand 
soldiers to secure.
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Tha government sought to calm tha faars ooncarning 
the oonfaranoa with statamants such as tha ana issued fay 
Hayashi Kiroku, a oounsallor of tha Foreign Ministry, who 
stated that "Japan's special position in the Par Bast is 
clearly recognised by all the powers and it is hardly con­
ceivable that they will approve of a policy that will run
122counter to Japan's interest." The Japanese approached 
the Washington Conference with distinct hope for a dis­
armament agreement to lessen th-j threat of war, particularly 
one which would limit Pacific fortifications, with a desire 
to be treated as an equal by the two predominant powers of 
the world, and with a hope to use the conference as a venue 
for explaining tha justness of the Japanese position, but 
with a fear that Japan might be pressured to rescind whet 
they considered her legitimately acquired rights.
Chapter 2
THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE
The Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armftlinit 
began on November 12, Belgium, the British Empire, China, 
France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal and the 
United States sent representatives. Since the British 
Empire, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States were the 
only major naval powers in the world, they agreed to exclude 
Belgium, China,the Netherlands, and Portugal from the dis­
cussions on the limitation and reduction of naval forces.
A. J. Balfour, Lord President of the Council, represented 
Britain in the bulk of the negotiations. The Japanese 
plenipotentiaries were the Minister of the Navy Admiral 
Baron Kato Tomosaburo, the Ambassador to the United States 
Baron Shidehara Kijuro, and the President of the House of 
Peers Prince Tokugawa lesato. The Vice Minister for Foreign 
Affairs Hanihara Masanao was also a delegate. Secretary of 
State Charles Evans Hughes conducted the brunt of the nego­
tiations for the United States
The American government began the first plenary session
of the conference at 10s30 a.m. on November 12 in Memorial
2Continental Hall. Although at subsequent plenary sessions 
the delegates generally presented the official agreements 
reached during the course of the negotiations and the view­
points of the various governments, this first plenary session 
of the conference differed from that of most) the delegates 
did not merely exchange diplomatic niceties as was expected. 
Hughes used the meeting as a worldwide fetnam to present a 
concrete and detailed American plan for the limitation and
- 58-
reduction of naval forces. Hughes read his proposal to the 
delegations and members of the press. He proposed a ten 
year naval holiday and presented four basic principles for 
naval disarmaments 1) capital ship building was to be 
halted 2) naval forces were to be reduced by the scrapping 
of ships 3) reductions were to be made with regard to the 
existing naval strength of the powers and 4) capital ship 
tonnage was to be used as a measure of naval strength, with 
a proportionate tonnage of auxiliary craft allotted. These 
auxiliary craft included cruisers, destroyers, and submar­
ines.^ Hughes proposed that the ratio of naval strength 
between the United States, Great Britain, and Japan be 
frozen at the existing level. He included in the strength 
of a navy those ships whose keels had already been laid 
down, allotting them strength proportionate to the extent 
to which they had been completed, i.e., a navy, which pos­
sessed a 60% completed 35,000 ton battleship, was given 
21,000 tons of capital ship strength. He proposed that 
the powers halt construction on all capital ships and 
abandon future expansion plans. Furthermore, they were to 
scrap all predreadnoughts and capital ships of the second 
line, and predreadnoughts were not to be considered in 
measuring the existing strength of a fleet.
Japan was to abandon her 8-8 plan. The Xii, Owara, 
No. 7, and No. 8 battleships and the Nos. 5, 6, 7, and 8 
battlecruisers, none of which had as of yet been laid
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down, wore to be scrapped. Japan was to scrap three battle­
ships, the Mutsu which had already been launched but which 
the U.S. claimed was only 981 complete, and the Tosa and 
Xaga which were under construction. She was to scrap four 
battlecruisers, the Amagi and Akagi, which were being built, 
and the Atago and Takao, for which some materials had been 
assembled. If Japan accepted the American plan she would 
reduce her navy by 289,110 tons of new capital ships. Also 
she would scrap all predreadnoughts and capital ships of the 
second line, up to but not including the Settsu, for a total 
reduction of 10 older ships of 159,828 tons. In total, 
she would reduce her capital ship strength by 448,920 tons, 
the U.S. would reduce its str ngth by 835,740 tons, and 
Great Britain would reduce its strength by 583,375 tone. 
Japan would retain 10 capital ships, the Nagato, Huiga, lee, 
Yamashiro, Fu-So, Settsu, Kirishima, Haruna, Hi-Yei, and 
Kongo, a total of 299,000 tons. The U.S. would retain 18 
capital ships of 500,650 tons and Great Britain would retain 
22 capital ships of 600,540 tons. As capital ships reached 
their age limits, Great Britain and the United States would 
be able to replace theirs with a total of 500,000 tons, 
while Japan was allotted replacement tonnage of 300,000 
tons. The American proposal limited the displacement of 
individual capital ships to 35,000 tons. The proposal 
allotted Great Britain and the United States auxiliary
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surf ace combatant craft of 450,000 tons each and Japan 
auxiliaries of 270,000 tons. Great Britain and the 0.8. 
were to maintain 90,000 tons of submarines while Japan would 
maintain 54,000 tons. The proposal limited Japan to 48,000 
tons of aircraft carriers and Great Britain and the United
4States to 80,000 tons.
Yamato Ichihashi, who acted as interpreter for Admiral 
Kato wrote that Prince Tokugawa, Admiral Kato, and Baron 
Shidehararwere surprised at the boldness of the American
5proposal. American press members wrote that their faces 
gave away their surprise.6 However K. K. Kawakami, who often 
acted as a propogandlst for the Japanese viewpoint in his 
dispatches to the Boston Globe, wrote that a Japanese knowl­
edgeable in naval affairs saidi "The American suggestion 
goes a little further than we had expected, but the dis­
crepance between it and our idea though material,«is not
7great.” The proposal, although it did not mention Pacific 
fortifications, did not differ drastically from the posi­
tion which the Japanese navy had adopted in the summer.
Tokugawa was nominally the senior Japanese delegate 
but Shidehara and Kato were intended by the Japanese govern­
ment to conduct the negotiations. Prime Minister Hara chose 
Kato as a delegate as he felt that Kato's influence and 
prestige would help in countering ultranationalistic criti­
cism of an agreement and that he was the most likely to be
ftable to unite the navy behind new policies. Early in the 
conference Shidehara became ill and the principal burden of 
negotiations fell upon Kato. On November 15, Kato accepted 
the U.S* proposal in principle at the second plenary session 
of the conference. However, he stated*
It will be universally admitted that a nation 
must be provided with such armaments as are 
essential to its security. . . .  A few modifi­
cations will be proposed with regard to the 
tonnage basis for replacement of the various 
classes of vessels. . . .  1 know that the
American and other delegations will consider 
them witn the same desire to meet our ideas as 
we have to meet theirs.9
Kato expressed no fear that the American plan was an 
attack on the security of the Japanese Empire but was not 
willing, as were none of the other delegations, to accept 
the American proposal in toto. The delegates negotiated for 
nearly three months before formally concluding the Five Power 
Treaty on Naval Disarmament, the Nine Power Treaty on China, 
the Treaty on the Use of Noxious Gases and Submarines, and 
the Chinese Tariff Treaty. The Four Power Treaty, the agree­
ments reached between China and Japan concerning the relin­
quishment of rights by Japan in Shantung, and the agreement 
to settle the Yap island cable dispute were all concluded dur 
ing the same time period as the conference, but were not 
discussed formally within the scope of the conference.
In addition to meeting at the plenary sessions the 
delegates and representatives met in subcommittees. The
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minutes of the meetings of these committees and subcommittees 
were not recorded verbatim and the speakers edited the pub­
lished text themselves.*** Outside of these committees and 
subcommittees, the delegates met at the State Department and 
the private residence of the Secretary of State. On Novem­
ber 16 the Japanese delegation presented its "few modifica­
tions" to the American proposals. The modifications were 
as follows: 1) Japan's ratio was to be changed to at least
70%, 2) the Mutsu and the Aki were to be retained and 3)
Japan was to have parity in aircraft carriers.** On the 
nineteenth Kato met with Balfour and Hughes. He requested 
that Japan be allowed to maintain 70% of American strength.
He emphasized that the ratio had been determined after long 
study, that it was supported by the public and all parts of 
the government, not only the navy, and that the government 
had responded to interpellations in the Diet on the basis
i o
that Japan needed 70%. Kato1s negotiating style was 
typical of pre-World War II Japanese diplomats. His options 
were limited as the proposals which he made were "the end 
product, in a sense the lowest common denominator, of pro­
tracted domestic haggling and debate." His instructions 
contained "for one or more of the parties to the original 
decision, something quite close to its minimum or final 
position." His use of the intransigence of Japanese public
opinion was an example of "perhaps the most common argument
13raised by Japanese negotiators against concessions."
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The Subcommittee of Eaval Experts examined the Ameri­
can proposal. The American and Japanese delegations dis­
agreed over the method of defining existing naval strength 
and thus over the existing strength of the Japanese fleet.
The Americans maintained that the status quo in the ratios 
of naval strength was to be fixed while absolute tonnage was 
to be reduced. To these naval experts, naval strength i#- 
eluded not only ships completed but those under construction 
in proportion to the degree to which they were finished.
The Japanese naval experts asserted that the only real measure 
of naval strength was the number of ships afloat. They main­
tained that in case of an emergency ships which were not yet 
completed could not be considered as part of a nation's 
strength. The Japanese naval experts led by Vice-Admiral 
Kato Kanji presented the following table which summarised 
the difference of opinioni*4
American strength Japanese strength
(1) Pre-Dreadnoughts 100% 
Dreadnoughts
Superdread nough t s
(2) Dreadnoughts 100% 
Superdreadnoughts
(3) Superdreadnoughts 100%
Japanese 
method of 
classification 
76%
70%
86%
§f %
67%
86%
The Japanese naval experts asserted that no matter how 
capital ships were grouped, even excluding predr^lnoughts 
in the measure of strength as was done by the American 
experts, Japan had at least a 70% ratio of the existing 
strength of the American fleet. The negotiations of the 
Subcommittee of Naval Experts reached an impasse over these 
problems, it was not a technical dispute for both sides 
agreed on the calculations; it was a policy dispute for they 
did not agree on the basis for those calculations.
While the naval experts were in the process of agreeing 
to disagree, Admiral Kato, on November 23, cabled four pos­
sible plans to his government. These were as follows!
1) to stick to J a p a n 1s original proposal 2) to push for a 
6 5 ^  ratio and the inclusion of the Mutsu 3) to accept a 60% 
ratio and include the Mutsu or 4) to accept the American 
proposal. The government responded on November 28. It 
urged Kato to achieve plan 1, or if that were not possible 
to achieve plan 2, or if plan 2 proved to be unattainable to 
accept a 60% ratio and the Mutsu only if there were an agree­
ment to reduce or freeze Pacific fortifications. The govern-
15ment urged Kato not to accept the American proposal. On 
December 1, Kato met privately with Balfour in an attempt 
to find an area of agreement. He did not present Plan 2.
He went straight to Plan 3 suggesting that Japan might be
•' ■ ■
willing to accept the 60% ratio, in exchange for the U.S. 
agreeing to relinquish its rights of further strengthening 
of the fortifications in the Phillipines, Guam, and Hawaii. ® 
From Kato's point of view, his plan was much better stra­
tegically for Japan and was in agreement with the opinion 
of a number of naval strategists but not all. His naval 
experts could not agree; . Kato trusted his own judgment.
At a meeting on the subsequent day with Balfour and 
Kato, Hughes, who recognized that the naval experts hid 
reached an impasse, proposed that the chief delegates attempt 
to reach a solution amongst themselves. Balfour mentioned 
the proposal which Kato had made on December 1 concerning 
the exchange of the acceptance of the 601 ratio for a non­
fortification agreement. Kato expressed perplexity at 
achieving an agreement and maintaining the 70% ratio. He 
explained that the 70% ratio had been decided upon a long
time ago and yet the Japanese desire for disarmament was
17also very real* To the American government K a t o 9e explana­
tion seemed to coincide with the real situation in Japan. 
Ambassador Warren reported a campaign in the press which he
felt was orchestrated by the navy to build support for the 
1870% ratio. Warren later reported that in meetings with 
Foreign Minister Uchida on December 3 and 7 Uchida agreed 
that the delegates had not been instructed to hold firmly 
to the 70% ratio, and that in a meeting of the Diplomatic 
Advisory Council Uchida did not actually mention the ratio.
• 65-
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He had merely reported that the government wa* considering
ratios as part of an overall settlement. This implied to
Warren that the government was willing to accept the 60%
19ratio in exchange for a nonfortification agreement.
Reaction in Japan to the American Proposal 
Japanese press reaction to the American proposal was 
approximately the same as Xato had explained to Hughes and 
Balfour. The opinions split along fairly predictable lines. 
The newspapers which had been early disarmament advocates gen­
erally supported acceptance of the American proposals. Some, 
which held ambivalent attitudes toward America, ware pleased 
with the proposals and advocated acceptance. Those which 
were the most nationalistic, although expressing gratitude 
at American Aincerity, became instantly suspicious again 
when it beoame apparent that Japan might not achieve all 
her demands. There were certain anti-military and anti- 
naval newspapers that urged acceptance of the American pro­
posals. The Japan Times commented!
The plan is drastic but the situation to be met 
requires drastic remedies, not mere palliatives.
Zf there has to be an operation on the Big Navy 
plans of the Powers let it be a major operation, 
with the knife driven deep to the seat of the 
trouble.2®
The Jlji declared that Japan should readily accept the 
American plan, while the Tokyo Asahl was impressed by the 
American attitude. The Yamato saw no reason for Japan to 
hesitate over the American proposition and declared that
there could be no justifiable objection from anywhere. The 
Hochi and Kokumin were more circumspect in their reactions.
The Hochi# although it felt that American sincerity multi­
plied the possibility of armament restriction# advised that 
there be cautious investigation before Japan concluded an 
agreement. The Kokumin# while lauding the American proposal#
was anxious that there be more of a balance of naval itrength
21in the Pacific than that outlined by Hughes.
Although the majority of the navy supported an arms limi­
tation agreement# they still attempted to protect their service 
and the empire in the way they thought best* Some officers 
took action to counteract the effect of the American proposal 
on public opinion and were effective in changing the editor­
ial position of some newspapers• The Tokyo fflchi Nlchi 
quoted the reaction of an unnamed naval source to the Ameri­
can plan. Since the navy had decided to agree to a plan 
which would allow ships under construction to be completed# 
the officer characterised the proposal to limit the navies 
to warships only floating as absurd and stated that it was 
"absolutely Impossible for Japan to consent to such a 
ridiculous proposal." He did admit that America was making 
a large sacrifice in battleships and battlecruisers under 
construction# but if these sacrifices were to be compared 
to those of Japans
where two battleships [the Tosa and the Kata] 
are on the point of being launched and one 
half of two battlecruisers have already been
built, the figures will readily show that the 
proposal will be far more advantageous to the 
United States. . . . Judging from the main 
principle of naval defenre whereby a power 
must possess at least seven-tenths of the naval 
strength of its supposed enemy, the proposal of 
the United States affixing Japan's total tonnage 
to not more than six-tenths of her tonnage. . . 
constitutes nothing less than a case of a 
disregard of the fundamental principles of naval 
strategy, and to whioh it is impossible for,.
Japan to give any form of consent whatever.22
these officers played on the sympathy which Would arise
for those thrown out of work by the plan. Vice-Admiral 
Funakoshi, Chief of the Yokosuka Naval Arsenal, generally 
welcomed the American proposal and the huge sacrifices which 
the U.S. was willing to make, but expressed doubt as to 
whether an agreement could be reached under the American 
terms. He stated that three battleships, all nearly com­
plete, would have to be scrapped, the Muteu which was 
almost complete (italics mine], the Kaga which was to be 
launched on November 17, and the Tosa which was scheduled 
to be launched on December 20. He statedi
. . .  it would be a most serious problem if they 
have to be scrapped. . . .  a ten year naval 
holiday would be a disastrous blow not only to 
the Naval arsenals but also, to the Kawasaki 
and Mitsubishi Dockyards.23
A Kokusai staff reporter wrote of the overtly negative 
reaction in the naval ports and dockyards to the American 
plan. He reported that in Maidsuru, the principal naval 
port on the Sea of Japan, "seven thousand artisans are 
faced with a critical situation and the prosperous ports
will be thrown back at least ten years." People in Kure and 
Osaka were shocked at the American proposal. The question 
was: how will the Osaka Iron Works, the Kujinagata Ship­
yard, the Osaka Chain Factory, and the Sumitomo Steel
24Foundry carry on without navy business?
The Japanese navy kept up its push for a 701 ratio.
On November 18 Admiral Baron Yashiro advocated that Japan
maintain 70% of the strength of the American navy and declared
that Japan was justified in her desire to maintain the Ntttau.
He also pointed out that disarmament would not be oomplete
95until all advanced naval bases were abolished. Vice- 
Admiral Kato Xanji, who was the chief Japanese naval expert 
at the conference, on November 29 told an interviewer that 
the naval ratio question was one of the utmost concern for 
the security of nations. "I hope therefore," he continued, 
"that the United States will acoept the seventy percent
ratio for Japan, as it is the minimum strength demanded to
26secure her safety." Although Prince Tokugawa publicly
announced that Kato's statements were his own opinions
and did not represent the decisions of the delegation,
Kato and the others were effective in garnering domestic
27 —support for the 70% ratio. Vice-Admiral Kato Kanji was 
only repeating an earlier statement of Admiral Kato 
Tomosaburo that t
Japan is unabla to accept the ratio of 60 per­
cent because she considers it impossible to 
provide for her security and defense with any 
force less than 70 percent. She desires to 
have the proposed ratio modified so that the 
relative-strength of the three navies will be 
10-10-7.28
The effect of naval propaganda on press opinions was 
quite strong. The Jijl, which had advocated accepting the 
American proposal, later expressed hope that an agreement 
would be reached after a free exchange of opinion. Zt 
believed that America was well aware of the importance of a 
fair distribution of naval strength and would not take such
an absolute opinion that the original proposal was unalter-
20 — able. On December 1 it expressed a desire that Kato
Tomosaburo remain firm on the 70% d e m a n d . T h e  Hlefai liichl 
reported that the Maryland was not really complete and since 
the Mutsu would have been complete two weeks before the open­
ing of the Washington Conference if the dockyard workers had
not struck, the scrapping of the Mutsu while allowing America
31to maintain the Maryland was unfair.
There were some papers which maintained their positive 
attitudes even in the face of the initial onslaught of 
naval propaganda. The Vcmluri wrote that 70% of Kato's 
brain was military and 30% was that of a statesman. It 
expressed appreciation of his firm stand on the 70% ratio but 
hoped that he would not push his contention to the breaking 
point. 2 The Japan Times and Mall consistently editorialised 
in favor of accepting the American plan. Zn fact its editors
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felt that the ratio problem mas settled before the Tokyo 
agitation, which forced the delegatee to hold out for 
70%, began. This agitation wee based mi an attempt to 
"inculcate the idea in the minds of the Japanese people 
that in e o M  way* America earn dictating to Japan and was 
arbitrarily attempting to force endue sacrifices span the 
people of Utia country.*33 the flVlflhit wonted an agree­
ment to be reached due to financial considerations.34 the 
Chuo. which was the government organ, broached the possi­
bility of accepting Kato's Plan 3. it statad that if the 
Pacific ware neutralised threufh the abolition of all 
insular naval bacua and fortifications, Japan would be 
willing to accept the cot ratio.33
Tha business community's reaction to the American pro­
ps* si was generally positive. Xdeda Kansc, President of the 
Tokyo tanker's Association, wee quoted by Mia Moahl. "X do 
net knew if hughes' proposal la fair or net as I'm net a 
naval enpert but if it is X would greatly weloosw the idea 
of a mutual agreameat being concluded without delay." if 
Hughes' propesel materialises, "axospting for a temporary 
blow to part of the shipbuilding and steal industry, move­
ment of capital would become greatly facilitated, thereby 
creating a general [improvement) in industrial and commer­
cial conditions and adding to the general welfare of the 
nation.”36 Tha -T*r|f rePorted that numerous organisa­
tions and sooiatias adopted resolutions extremely favorable
- ? 2-
to disarmament, e .g., the Alumni Club of Nichiren Uni vara ity 
and tha Tokyo Association for the Reduction of Armaments, 
which included among its members, Osaki Yukio and Shimada
____ 37Saburo, both prominent ambers of the Diet. Labor also 
supported disarmament. Representatives of It labor organi­
sations met on December 13 in Tokyo ami adopted resolutions 
approving Japan's acceptance of naval limitation and urging 
the abolition of capital ships. They also urged the reduc­
tion of the army by SOI, a shorter term of military service,
government responsibility for unemployment resulting from
3Sthe naval holiday, and proper relief for the unemployed.
The opposition political parties sesawd to be less con*
earned with the substance of the a r m  reduction negotiations
than with the opportunity which the conference gave them to
attack the government, viscount Kato at a party meeting
on December 7 expressed a lack of understanding of the whole
ratio question. "As the United States and Japan are both
independent Powers it seems more reasonable to have their
strength evenly balanced.” Since the U.s. proposes removing
the threat of offensive actions, he asked, why are any
defensive weapons needed?
Why doesn't Japan propose the total destruction 
of all battleships that are capable of travelling 
a long distance across the sea to attack other 
powers? This would then prove that Japan is 
fully sincere in her wish for peace.
The overtly political nature of his motives are illuminated
76
by the following remarks. He expressed the desire that more
money be spent on education.
The Government Party lays special importance on 
higher education but education of the people is 
far more important. The government should 
provide at least one-half of the salary of pri­
mary school teachers which are said to amount 
to ¥100,000,000, out of the national treasury 
funds. . . . The Opposition Party will spare 
no effort at the coming session of the Diet in 
pushing the Universal Suffrage bill through, so 
as to give the smaller taxpayers chances of voting 
equal with those of the middle class and above
The Original Four Power Pact
While the controversy over the ratio raged in Japan, the 
negotiators at Washington turned to the replacement of the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance with a Pacific entente. The four 
power consultative pact, that was concluded among Great 
Britain, France, Japan, and the United States, was designed 
to replace the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. It was originally 
proposed by the Japanese as a tri-partite pact which obligated 
th<3 adhering parties to consult in case of disputes arising 
in relation to their insular possessions and insular domin­
ions in the Pacific. The Japanese government had decided in 
May 1920 to renew the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and continued
to favor its renewal at the beginning of the Washington 
40Conference. They desired its renewal for four basic 
reasons:
1) In the post-war era of Anglo-Saxon domination the alli­
ance would enable Japan to avail herself of the use of 
Britain's help in a dispute with a third country.
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2) Abrogation would lead to Britain stationing a powerful 
naval force in the Far Bast.
3) since Japan alone among the powers was of a different 
race, without the alliance other nations might manifest 
^nti-Japanese sentiments more plainly.
4) Britain's major interests in the Far East were economic 
and not political and she wanted to uphold the economic 
status quo.
The government wanted to continue the alliance, with the 
cooperation of the U.S., in order to prevent Japan from 
becoming internationally isolated and to consolidate her 
international status. They decided that if it became diffi­
cult to achieve these aims because of the situation at the 
conference, or if continuing the alliance would not accom­
plish the government's goals, they would not insist on its 
renewal; instead they would try to establish a new agree** 
ment to reflect an understanding among Japan, Britain, 
and the United States.41
In a meeting of December 2 Kato agreed with Hughes and
Balfour to include France in the negotiations for a Pacific
42 —agreement. In these negotiations Kato expressed no regret
at the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The Four
Power Pact fulfilled the Japanese desires for an entente to
replace the alliance. There were, however, a number of
points of disagreement which arose during the negotiations
tor the conclusion at ths past. Ons of thaaa points was 
discussed on December 6 at a meeting of Kato, Hughes, and 
Balfour. Kato proposed that the delegates insert a Stipula­
tion into the body of the pact concftblng the free and 
peaceful development of commerce in the Pacific, Ha pro­
posed this in order to make clear the harmonious relation­
ship between Japan and the United States and to let tha docu­
ment embody the principles of the Open Door and equal oppor­
tunity in the Pacific. Otherwise it was thought difficult 
to succeed in garnering domestic support for ths treaty it 
that time. Hughes suggested that they place the stipulation 
in the preamble but Balfour refused to accept its insertion 
anywhere in the body or the preamble, so Kato withdraw his 
proposal.
On December 8 Hughes, Vivian! and Jusserand for Prance, 
Balfour, Malkin, and Hankey for Great Britain, and Shidehara, 
Kato and Saburi Sadao for Japan met at tha home of the 
Secretary of State to discuss the proposed consultative 
pact. In discussing the term "insular possessions,"
Baron Shidehara asked whether these terms would be inter­
preted to include the main islands of Japan. Hughes responded 
that he thought the terms would have to be interpreted in 
that manner. Shidehara then said he wished the main islands 
of Japan to be excluded from the terms of the pact, as the 
mainlands of none of the other parties were included.
Balfour retorted that Australia and Hew Zealand were subject
to the terms of the pact and that if Japan were excluded
these dominions had to be excluded also. During the course
of this rather lengthy conversation Shidehara repeatedly
emphasized that as long as the Pacific shores of the United
States and Canada were not included, it would not be fair
to include the main islands of Japan. He wanted Japan to
be treated on an equal footing with Canada and the United
States. He also made the point that Japanese public senti-
43ment might take umbrage if Japan proper ware included.
On the next day at the outset of a meeting of the same per­
sons, Shidehara declared that he was willing to relinquish 
his claim for excluding the main islands of Japan. On 
December 10 the powers announced the conclusion of the Four 
Power Pact and on the thirteenth they signed it. At that 
time they exchanged no notes concerning the scope of the 
applicability of the term "insular possessions."4'
The Japanese press reaction to the proposal of a 
four power agreement was generally positive. The pact 
had leaked out in the Jlil Shimno because Prince Tokugawa, 
not realising the importance of the document, had left it 
in his desk.45 The Yomiuri. the Jiii. the Nichi Hichi. the 
Hochi and the Yamato all expressed approval of the proposed 
entente. The Yomiuri wrote that it had repeatedly emphasised 
the necessity of an entente to replace and embody all the
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principls* of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the Lenelng-Xehli 
Agreement, the Franco-Japan Convention, and all the other 
agreements and declarations for the maintenance of Chins'*
itterritorial integrity, the Open Door, and equal opportunity.
To the Jiji the conclusion of the entente relieved the naval
47conflict of its gravity. The Niohl Nichi also welcomed
the entente as it would prove the strongest guarantee of
48peace in the Pacific. The Yamato expressed its approval
but stated t!iat the main question was the sincerity of the
powers. It believed that if they were sincere in working
out the treaty then all Pacific problems would find their
49own solutions. The Yorodsu disssented from the majority 
position, it vehemently disapproved of the proposed ententes 
To it the entente could never take the place of the Anglo* 
Japanese Alliance and it would be better to abandon the
ftAalliance than replace it with a make-believe agreements
The government after approving the pact attempted to
present it in the best light possibles Premier Takahashi
issued a statement on December 13. "The conclusion of the
Quadruple Entente creates an absolute bulwark against war.*
President Harding "must be congratulated upon the grandest
contribution toward peace that has ever been recorded in
human history." This profuse praise of the pact can only
be interpreted as an attempt to drown out expected criti*
cism. Yet, this criticism was not forthcoming from the
SIleaders of the Kenseikai who expressed their approval.
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Tha Conclusion of an Agraanant to Limit Capital Ships 
Tha day aftar tha conclusion of tha Four Powar Pact 
Japan and the United States announced a final agreement 
concerning tha Yap problem. Tha United States agreed to 
recognise the mandate rights of Japan over the formerly 
German islands in the North Pacific, in exchange for cer­
tain concessions relating to the operation of T*rans-Paeific
52cables many of which landed at Yap* Subsequent to this the 
subject Of conversations between Hughes, Kato, and lalfour 
returned to the ratio disagreement. Hughes, due to the 
information he had received from Ambassador Warren, believed 
that Kato if he were to hold out for a 701 ratio in capital 
ships would not have the support of the political side of 
the government. Warren had reported of a meeting with 
Foreign Minister Uchida, in which Uchida had said that Japan 
was much more concerned with fortifications in the Fhllli~ 
pines and Guam than one battleship more or less^^^^^l^ 
then secured the Foreign Minister’s agreement that he was 
correct in assuming that the political side of the govern­
ment was willing to^exchange the acceptance of a 60%
ratio in capital ships, for the maintenance o the status
52quo in fortifications on Guam and in the Phillipines.
After the December 2 meeting, in which the delegates 
had discussed exchanging the 601 ratio for a nonfortifica­
tion agreement, Kato had cabled his government informing 
them of the progress of these conversations and asking for
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nsw instruction*. He received these instructions on the 
10th. Be was to propose that the U.S. and Japan* and other 
powers if necessary, agree to maintain their existing de­
fense positions in Pacific islands lying a distance fro* 
their homelands. Japan proper was not to be included. The 
exclusion of Hawaii was acceptable only if the U.S. strongly 
opposed its inclusion. He was told that the government 
wanted the non-fortification principle stipulated as far as
possible in the body of either the Four Power Pact or the 
54naval treaty. In a meeting with Hughes and Balfour on 
December 10, Xato, following instructions, accepted the €0% 
ratio in exchange for non-fortification and insisted 
on the retention of the Mutsu, the newest addition to the 
Japanese fleet, which had been commissioned on December 1 
and was one of the most powerful warships afloat, the Ameri­
cana listed the Nutsu ae 98* complete but Xato clained that 
at the opening of the Conference the Nutsu was 1001 cou­
plets, and by December 10 had already steamed 2S00 miles
*on its own power. Therefore, it was not a candidate for 
scrapping but should be used in estimating the existing 
strength of the Japanese fleet and thereby the ratio between
*There is confusion as to whether this ship was com­
plete or not. Admiral Coonts of the U.S. Navy told Hughes 
that they had mistakenly listed the ship as incomplete but 
Vice-Admiral Funakoshi, Chief of the Yokosuka Naval Arsenal# 
among other Japanese stated that the ship had not yet been 
completed (Dingman# Power in the Pacific, p. 234; above#
P* me *)
it and that of the American fleet. Kato proposed scrapping 
the Settsu, the oldest ship which Japan was to retain, in 
lieu of scrapping the Mutsu. Kato also agreed with Hughes 
that in such a case the United States and Great Britain 
should be allowed to increase their strength proportionately, 
in order to keep the ratios of 5 1 5 13 always allowing for the 
age factor. To solve this problem required meetings on three 
more days, if Japan retained the Mutsu, she would have two 
post-Jutland ships in that and the Nagato. Therefore, the 
delegates agreed in later discussions that the United States 
would be allowed to finish two of its Maryland class ships, 
giving it three post-Jutland ships, and in exchange would 
scrap the North Dakota and the Delaware. Great Britain agreed 
to build two new ships and scrap four of her ships of the 
King George V type.55
The most interesting aspect of this controversy is the 
way in which Kato did in affect yield to the American posi­
tion, both on ratios and on the calculation of existing 
strength in order to achieve a nonfortifioation agreement. 
Kato, who had agreed to accept the American principles for 
arms control which included the maintenance of the relative 
status quo, by accepting the 60% ratio accepted the premise 
that the strength of the Japanese fleet was 60% of that of 
the United-States. Also, by agreeing that the retention of 
the Mutsu necessitated a correspond^ • g increase in the
steengths of the British and American fleets, he acoepted the 
60% ratio. This is in sharp contrast to the position, taken 
at later conferences by Japanese delegates, that Japan had 
never accepted the 60% ratio as such.
On December 15 the agreement was announced to the press. 
The United States was to have 18 capital ships, Great Britain 
20, and Japan 10. The powers were to maintain the status quo 
of the fortifications on their islands in the Pacific, in­
cluding Hong Kong,and excluding Japan proper, Australia,
New Zealand, the coasts of the U.S. and Canada, and Hawaii.
The maximum replacement tonnage was 525,000 tons each for 
the United States and Great Britain, and 315,000 tons for 
Japan. The Japanese press throughout 1921 had decried the 
construction of bases in the Pacific by the United States.
In November both the Jiji and the Chuo had proposed that 
the powers reach an agreement to restriot Paoific fortifica­
tions. The Chuo proposed that Japan dismantle its fortifi­
cations on the Bonin islands and the Ryukyus in exchange for
5?which the U.S. would dismantle its Hawaiian bases. Before
the tentative capital ship limitation agreement was announced
on December 15, all the papers, except the Hochi, reported
58that Japan would unconditionally accept the 60% ratio.
The Hoohl reported correctly that Japan would accept the 
60% ratio in exchange for a nonfortification agreement in 
the Pacific. It attacked the government for accepting 
such a plan. The paper declared that the two issues of the
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naval ratio and Pacific fortifications ware separata and that
it was necessary for Japan to insist on a 70% ratio. It
wrote that if Japan failed to secure such an agreement, non-
fortification would never mitigate the menace to which Japan
59would be exposed in the future. The press reaction to the 
agreement was generally positive with a few exceptions. The 
Kokumin wrote that the government gave in because it feared 
that insistence on a 70% ratio might lead to the Washington
Conference reaching an abortive end, and that Japan would
be shouldered with the blame. It stated that this would be
the height of absurdity indeed.
Theoretically speaking the sovereignty and the 
right of independence of each country must be 
equal in value, and consequently the strength 
of armament to defend them should be on an equal 
footing. . . . Our authorities are surprisingly 
cowardly in dealing with foreign countries.60
The Yorodsu wrote thati
Japan had batter have made no amendment at all, 
if she is to follow America's dictation after 
411. . . . The oppression of title Western 
countries will hereafter be centered upon 
Japan and other Far Eastern countries, it 
must be remembered. . . . America has, in­
deed, made fools of the Japanese delegates. .
. . thS world will in future [sic] be dominated 
by the Anglo-Saxon rices, and no other race Will 
have a right to meddle with world affairs, either 
politically or economically. . . .6i
The business community was generally happy at the
conclusion of an agreement between the nations. They
desired that taxes be reduced. Fujiyama Raita, president of
the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce, expressed his views on where
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the saved money could be used. He said that if the army
were reduced in the same proportion as the navy ¥400,000,000
could be saved. He suggested that nearly half be used to
abolish taxes, which were considered to retard industrial
progress or to interfere with the national well-being. The
balance could be used for the development of industry and
62the improvement of the standard of culture. The political 
parties and government leaders waited until formalised agree­
ments had been reached and the opening of the Diet before 
they expressed their opinions on the results of the Washing* 
ton Conference.
The reaction of the Japanese navy to the conclusion of 
a capital ship limitation agreement was generally positive. 
Admiral Kato, who realised that a war with the U.S. had to 
be avoided, reacted positively to the conclusion of the agree 
ment. According to K a t o 9s interpreter# Kato felt that the 
agreement removed the basis for distrust among the powers# 
relieved the burdens of taxation# and that after ten years 
of freedom from mistrust due to the naval holiday# people
might decide to stop the construction of naval armaments
63completely. Kate's reaction was fairly typical; 
the balance of opinion in the navy was that bases were 
the key to the maintenance of the defense of the empire. 
However# some members of the navy did not react favorably 
to an agreement which they felt might decrease the size,
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power, influence and prestige of the organization. Lt. 
Commander Ishimaru'a opinion is representative of this 
view. He thought that the treaty hurt Japan. He thought 
that it gave the United States and Great Britain navies cap­
able of offensive actions but did not give Japan a navy cap­
able of defensive action. He had three basic objectionss 
1) the ratio made Japan insecure in the Pacific 2) since 
American ships were better than Japanese ships, the agreement 
gave Japan a disadvantageous fleet organization and 3) Japan 
had sacrificed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and under the 
terms of the Four Power Pact was made a copartner in guaran­
teeing the security of Guam and the Phillipines. Officers 
realized that they would be faced with a decrease in the 
number of naval personnel. An officer stated in Decembers 
NWe have no illusion as to what is ahead of us. A new era 
has dawned upon the Pacific and the world. He must ourselves 
be ready and willing to scrap ourselves."**
Controversies! Fortifications and Semantics 
Two more controversial issues showed the extent to which 
the Japanese delegates desired equality of treatment. One 
was a continuation of a previously settled problem, while 
the other was a new one. After the conclusion of the tenta­
tive three power agreement on capital ship reduction, the 
powers moved the negotiations for naval reduction to the 
Subcommittee of Fifteen on Naval Limitation. Here France 
and Italy presented their positions. When it became apparent
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that progress might better be facilitated by having more of 
the delegates present at the meetings, the powers agreed to 
move the negotiations to the Committee on the Limitation of 
Armament. Here they reached a tentative agreement, subject 
to final drafting of a treaty, in which both France and Italy 
accepted ratios of 35% of the British and American fleets. 
Britain in early January had pushed for the inclusion of the 
Bonin and Amami-Oshima Islands in the islands which Japan 
agreed not to fortify. The British delegates proposed to de­
fine the area of nonforfication by a map to a limited portion 
of the Pacific. In effect the area, which it proposed to 
include, excluded all the British mandate islands south of 
the equator, including New Guinea, and Singapore. On Jan­
uary 10 the heads of the delegations met to discuss the draft 
of the treaty. Both Hughes and Balfour wished to define 
the area of nonfortification in Article XIX of the agree­
ment but Kato refused. He stated that he was willing to 
make a declaration indicating that the Bonin Islands, the 
Amami Sshima Islands, the Pescadores, and Formosa were not 
to be fortified. However since the Bonin and Amami Sshiiia 
Islands were administered as part of Japan proper# and as 
it had already been announced in the press that Japan proper 
was to be excluded from the terms of the agreement, he could 
not agree to change it. Hughes and Balfour both urged that 
the area be defined within the treaty. Kato said he would 
have to consult his government in order to change the bbdy
• 65of the agreement.
In Japan there was a controversy over the British
proposal. In December the navy's desire to maintain and
improve fortifications in the Bonins and in the Ryukyus had
been reported. An unnamed high-ranking naval officer stated
that since these islands were a part of Japan proper the
improvement of their bases would still be permissible under
66the terms of the agreement. The army expressed concern at 
the British proposal for it would halt future southern expan­
sion. it also feared the ongoing shift in the domestic poli­
tical power balance. "In November the Taiyo, a leading 
journal of opinion, published a long article which demanded 
the abolition of separate service ministries and the estab- 
lishment of a single ministry of defense." In fact Prime 
Minister Takahashi had also called for the abolition of the 
general staffs before he became head of the government and 
the slogan of the Kokuminto was "army retrenchment." Also, 
they planned to introduce a resolution into the Dist in
February calling for a 50% reduction in the strength of tlii 
67array. Foreign Minister Uchida succumbed to army pressure 
and accepted its position on fortifications.68
Keto received instructions from his fovermpint in « 
series ef telegrams. In a telegram M  January i4, the 
government expressed Shdck at I p U n  fckUch Whdtd hat* Jftpan 
net only maintain th* statue qua in the defenses of the ionin 
end amssri-eshiMi iiiihdSi but also in isiands which ranged
from almost immediately south of Kyushu to the equator. Yet 
at the same time, the U.S. and Great Britain were trying to 
exempt their islands
Midway and the Aleutian Islands in the case of 
the United States, and Hew Guinea and all other 
islands south of the equator in the case of 
Britain, from the region agreed upon. Anybody 
can see how unfair this is. Especially in the 
British case, it will be utterly impossible to 
convince our people as to the grounds on which 
such an arbitrary delimitation of area can be 
based. . . • this problem is now turning out 
to be a grave matter bearing upon the suscepti- 
bilities and morale of the Japanese people.69
The government expressed fear at the result of acceptance of
the plan in view of the sacrifices which Japan had already
made in including Japan proper in the body of the Pour Power
Pact and in accepting the 60% ratio. If it accepted the
plan,
the Government would lose support and eventually 
find it difficult to maintain their position.
Of course, in view of the seriousness of the sit­
uation, what happens to a government may not 
matter. But to accept the British plan would 
surely result in inciting public opinion and 
intensifying our natlon*i anti-American and 
anti-British feelings.70
Kato then presented a direct challenge to the governments
"if Tokyo could not agree quickly on a compromise Bn island
fortification limits, he and the entire delegation would have
71no choic. but to re.ign." The gov.rmn.nt, which was faced 
with domestic political pressure, had to maintain a hard 
line to shore up its political power, but Xato in the style 
of most pre-World War II Japanese negotiators was much more
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72 _accommodative to foreign powers. Rato convinced the
army leaders to change their minds on the issues and subse-
73quently ^nkahashi and Uchida gave way.
On December 20 the government sent new instructions.
These stated that it might be possible to stipulate that the
Amami-Oahima islands and the Bonins were not to be fortified
in the body of the treaty, as long as the delegates made it
74clear that these islands were a part of Japan proper. With 
these new instructions it became possible for the powers to 
reach an agreement concerning Article XXX. In its final form 
this article named the islands which Japan agreed not to 
fortify any further, and specified areas for those of Great 
Britain and the U.S. The United States agreed not to further 
fortify its Pacific possessions including the Aleutians and 
excluding Hawaii. Great Britain agreed not to fortify its 
Pacific possessions, east of the meridian of 110° east longi­
tude, except those islands adjacent to the coast of Canada, 
Australia and its territories including Hew Guinea, and Hew 
Zealand. Japan agreed not to fortify the Kuriles, the
Bonins, the Amami Sshima Islands, the Ryukyus, Formosa,
74and the Pescadores.
All the papers reported that the Cabinet had decided on 
January 16 that the Bonins and the Ryukyus were not to be 
Included in the scope of the nonfortification agreement un­
less the United States agreed to maintain the status quo
75 ■ _in Hawaii. In fact Rato had mentioned this problem to
Hughea when he first proposed the inclusion of the Ryukyus. 
Kato stated it would upset domestic public opinion. They 
did reach a compromise when the U.S. agreed to include the 
Aleutians. The Kokumin reported correctly on January 23 
that Admiral Kato had threatened to resign if the government 
did not accede on the fortification i s s u e . t h e r e  was a 
negative reaction to these reports. The Tokyo Aaahi declared 
that the proposed restriction of Pacific fortification* was 
nothing less than a restriction of Japanese instead of Pacific 
fortifications, and that no localised restriction of Pacific 
fortresses could prove an effective assurance of a lasting 
peace in the Pacific. While the Hochl after it learned 
of the decision to agree to the restriction of fortifica­
tions attacked it as a "humiliating concession* and a "gross 
diplomatic blunder.*^8
When the Japanese delegates accepted the inclusion of 
Japan under the term "insular possessions” of the Pour Power 
Pact, they succumbed to British pressure and ignored the 
instructions of their government. They cabled for ex-post 
facto approval but the Japanese government refused in 
instructions of December 17. m e  instructions stated that 
Japan could not consent to being treated differently than 
the other three powers. They Cited an example of a potential 
problem^ if Japan were involved with difficulties in relation 
to her mainland with a third power, she would be bound to
discuss it with th* other three powers, but if on* of th* 
other three countries were in a similar situation in regard 
to their mainlands, they could act without consulting Japan 
or the other signatories of the pact. The government in­
structed its delegates to remove Japan from the scope of 
the treaty, even if this necessitated removing Australia 
and New Zealand as the British and Americans contended it 
would.79
On January 14 Shidehara met with Hughes to discuss th* 
inclusion of Japan under the terms of the Four Power Pact. 
Once again he brought up the previously made proposal for an 
exchange of notes to say that, as far as Japan was concerned 
the term "insular possessions* applied to Karafuto, i.e., 
th* southern half of Sakhalin, Formosa, the Pescadores and 
the mandated islands. Many Japanese considered it insulting 
that others even make a moral commitment to safeguard th* 
territorial integrity of Japan. To them Japan could defend 
herself. The Bonin and Amami-Sshima Islands were excluded 
as they were definitely considered a part of Japan proper 
and therefor* need he defended only by Japanese. Hughes, 
recognising that the Senate might frown upon an agreement 
which might necessitate the 0.8. to com* to th* defense of 
Japan, agreed to exclude Japan proper. The powers exchanged 
notes which defined tha islands to be included under th* 
term "insular possessions."80
Auxiliaries! A Vexing Problem 
Although the original American proposal included a plan 
to limit the overall tonnage of submarines and auxiliary 
crafts, the powers were unable to reach an agreement. The 
irreconcilable differences of Great Britain and France were 
largely the cause of this failure. The Main Committee on 
the Limitation of Armament conducted the negotiations for 
the limitation of auxiliary crafts. At the December 22 M e t ­
ing of this committee Lord Lee of the British Empire urged 
the abolition of the submarine. He argued that submarines 
were a menace to the merchant marine and were not effective 
in defending a coastline. Furthermore, he believed the use 
of submarines against the merchant marine to be unlawful and 
immoral and that they were not good for communication. France 
Italy, and Japan all disagreed with the British position on 
the usefulness of submarines; but Japan and Italy were will­
ing to agree to a limit on their overall tonnage acceptable 
to the U.S. and Great Britain, France however was not. The 
Japanese position on submarines illuminates their views on 
the weapons which they considered necessary for defense. 
Hanihara Masanao emphasised that Japan considered submarines 
legitimate weapons of self-defense which were no more atrooi- 
ous than poisonous gas or air bombs. For an insular nation 
like Japan they were an effective deterrent because they oould 
be used as movable mines for coastal defense and w e M  rela­
tively inexpensive.
the Japanese argument for the retention of st&marimes 
was representative of the post-war controversy over the chang 
ing relative value of naval weapons. Since many strategists 
felt that wartime developments gave advantages to ids 
nation in the defensive position and since the only poten­
tial naval enemy of Japan was the United States, it was 
necessary for Japan to maintain her defensive fighting power 
as much as possible. Admiral de Bon of the French delegation 
pointed out that France lost three battleships, five cruisers 
and other ships, in all 130,000 tons of warships during 
World War I to submarines, and that submarinas had been used
defensively both to protect the coast of Germany and in the
nsDardanelles*
French and British disagresment over auxiliaries pre­
cluded an agreement on their limitation. Sarraut argued 
that simce France was limited to five capital ships of 
35,000 tons each, it was ab solutely necessary for ths defense 
of the country ami its colon!** fdas she maintain 330,000 
tons of auxiliaries and SO,SO© teas o f  sahmmrinea* Balfour 
branded the French proposals as unrwsemdbSe. Be asked* 
if such a large tonnage of eeailiaries were necessary for 
a fleet with capital ship tonnage of 175,000 tsms, whet 
would b o  necessary for a  float with 3S0, OBO toms of capital 
ships? The Japanese accepted the American proposal in gsn- 
ersl concerning auxiliary craft tosmagee In effect Japan
•3
accepted a 60% ratio in aaxiliary tonnage.
• 95*
Although the powers concluded no general agreements fco
limit the tonnage of submarines and auxiliary crafts, they
did reach agreement on a number of points. The delegations
agreed that no ship, except a capital ship or an aircraft
carrier, was to displace more than 10,000 tons and that these
ships were not to be armed with guns with a caliber larger
84than 8 inches. They agreed to restrict the use of submar- 
ines. It was stated that submarines had to obey the prevail­
ing international rules in regard to attacking a merchant 
vessel. They had to ascertain the character of a vessel 
and provide safety to its passengers and crew before sinking 
the ship. In view of the practical impossibility of using 
submarines as commerce destroyers in llgpt of the previous 
stipulations, the powers agreed that the prohibition of the 
use of s u b m a r i n e  as commerce destroyers was binding among 
them.85
On December 30 Hughes again presented the original 
American proposal concerning aircraft earn*Jon. The sub­
stance of which was that total tonnage was to be W , 000 for 
the United States and Great Britain, and 4i,i$d for J apan.
Ho power was required to scrap excess tonnage until mefdaee- 
ment began. All carriers whose keels had been laid down 
before November 11 were allowed to be completed, a  power 
could build up to its limit and an aircraft carrier was not 
to carry guns with a caliber larger than 8 inches. Kato
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believed that Japan raquired three aircraft carriers 
called the attention of the committee toi
He
the insular character of his country, the exten­
sive character of her coast, the location of her 
harbors and the susceptibility of her cities, 
built of frame houses, to easy destruction by 
fire if attacked by bombs. All these necessitated 
Japan's having a certain number of airplanes and 
"portable airplanes", that is to say, a means of 
distributing airplanes in such a manner as ade­
quately to meet her local needs. Japan could 
not have an enormous number of air pi nee to be 
stationed in all places where they were seeded 
because she was economically incapable.®7
During this meeting Great Britain demanded 135,BO# tents, 
Italy 54,060 tons, and France 60,000 tons of aircraft car­
riers. Magfees, recognising that the relative demands of the 
respective powers were in keeping with the 5r5s3:1.75tl.7S 
formula, proposed that Britain and the U.S. be allowed to 
amiwtain 135,0## tons, Japan 81,000 tons, and Francs and 
6S,0#O tans of aircraft carriers each. All the delegations
agreed to this proposal. Once again Japan accepted e 60%
00ratio of American strength.
longest tins to he solved 
to sign tbs Treety 
return of Shantung
The problem which 
was the Shantung ieeee. chine ted 
of Versailles, insiating upon t 
by Japan. The conclusion of an 
and Japan required three months of 
Washington and the goo# office# of 
The nations signed an agjrsenenfc on 
agreed to transfer the Shantung
negotiations in
4 vtiTrmtt'' j*Daa 
to Chime and China
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agreed to pay for the railway in her own treasury notes
within fifteen years. They agreed that the two extensions
of the railway should be offered to the Four Power Consortium
as a common undertaking, that the mines along the railway
were to become the property of a company formed under a
special charter of the Chinese and Japanese governments,
and that the area of the former German leased territory of
89Kiaoch w would be opened to foreign trade.
Details of these negotiations are outside of the scope 
of this paper, but attitudes toward China were highly related 
to attitudes which Japanese held toward the West. The 
Japanese were extremely sensitive to any interference in their 
bilateral relations with China. Statements of Prince Tokugawa 
and Hanihara Masanao were indicative of this sensitivity to 
interference. On the way to the Washington Conference while 
in British Columbia, Tokugawa emphasized the d* i rability 
of cooperation with the U.S. However, he continued, "gen­
erally speaking, I hope that the questions at nue between 
China and Japan will be kept out of the Conference because
it is better to solve these questions between the nations
90involved, directly." Hanihara in late December 1921 
reiterated the position that the Sino-Japanese Treaty of 
1915 could only be considered by Japan and C h m  with no 
outside interference.
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The twenty one demands of the treaty must not 
interfere with the treaty rights of the United 
States or other nations. If there is any ques­
tion concerning the treaty it is one to be dealt 
with directly between the Chinese and Japanese 
Governments.®1
The Japanese felt that they were being treated unfairly
in China. The Japan Times, which was decidedly liberal and
pro-Western, agreed. It also expressed general approval of the
Open Door Policy. All in all:
it is apparent that everything that may truthfully 
be charged against Japan in China today may, with 
equal truth, be charged against almost every other 
Power, and that, everything considered, the Powers 
have only done in China what was necessary if any 
trade with that country were to be carried on. .
. . Japan . . . which has the most of any Power 
to gain from the strict application of the prin­
ciple of the Open Door, readily agrees to that 
principle and the principle of territorial inte­
grity for China proper. 2
Matsuoka Yosuke, future Foreign Minister of Japan, wrote an
article in the Manchurian Daily News in which he discussed
American-Japanese-Chinese relations. He criticized America
for singling out Japan's actions in China. He pointed out
that America's hands were dirty too. While she accused
Japan of militarism she had
annexed Arizona, New Mexico, Cuba, and the 
Phillipines. • . • There can be no comparison 
between Japan's position in the Far East and 
that of the United States to the same. The 
American interests do not go beyond the com­
mercial and industrial limits, whilst those 
of Japan are closely bound up with her very 
existence. • • • In this age of strenuous 
life, power and strength count, and those equipped 
with the highest shares of these attitudes are 
entitled to the foremost places in the congress 
of nations.®3
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The press reaction to the negotiations over and the 
conclusion of an agreement concerning Shantung, and to the 
general agreement relating to principles to be followed in 
dealing with China was mixed. In November it had been 
reported that the Japanese delegates were willing to agree to 
Japanese withdrawal from Shantung and Kiaochow, if Great Bri­
tain withdrew from Weihaiwei and if the powers recognized
the principle that Japan had special interests in Manchuria
94owing to her nearness and railway investments. The Yomiuri
expressed opposition to the return of the Liaotung Peninsula
arguing that Japan*s lease there was entirely different from
Great Britain*s lease of Weihaiwei. The paper emphasized that
22% of all Japanese residents abroad lived in Shantung, and
that Japan had growing interests in southern Manchuria in-
95eluding railways, mining rights, and trade. The Yamato 
felt that the Chinese people would receive strong moral 
stimulus, to say nothing of material benefits, from the 
abolition of consular jurisdiction and foreign post offices, 
as well as from the retrocession of leaseholds. It stated 
that it was the sincere desire of the Japanese people that 
China become a perfectly independent state but that it 
depended on the will and action of the Chinese themselves. v 
The reaction to the actual conclusion of an agreement was 
also mixed. The Tokyo press generally welcomed its con­
clusion and expressed the belief that it would enable the 
Chinese authorities to devote mbre attention to the improvement
101-
97of China's domestic conditions. The Nichi Nichi welcomed 
the agreement although it wondered why the Chinese did not 
appear to recognize the sacrifices that Japan had made. The 
Yamato, the Yorodzu, and the Hochi attacked the agreement.
The Varoato, changing from its earlier position, said that 
Japan had been humiliated and treated like a defendant in 
a lawsuit, while the Yorodzu felt that Japan was now obliged 
to make huge sacrifices for the sake of America.
Reactions to the Conclusion of the Washington Conference 
After the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese agreement 
the Washington Conference officially closed. Naval competi­
tion in capital ships was halted. An agreement was in place 
to safeguard the peace of the Pacific in the instrument of 
the Four Power Pact. The United States and Japan had settled 
all the outstanding diplomatic disputes between them and the 
powers had, nominally at least, agreed on a joint policy and 
set of principles to be followed , n regard to China. The 
conference was not as successful as some had hoped but 
largely accomplished its purpose; it stopped the huge capi­
tal ship buildup which was creating such a large drain on 
the finances of Great Britain, Japan, and the United States. 
Vast amounts of money were freed for new uses. The U.S. 
and Japan opened a period of calmness in their bilaterial 
relations; in the minds of the Japanese there could be no 
justifiable excuse for any Westerners to hold an image of 
Japan as a militaristic power. She had proven her good faith.
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The Japanese Diet began its work in January of 1922, 
The opposition used the Diet as a forum to attack the poli­
cies of the government. Viscount Kato attacked Admiral 
K a t o 's acceptance of the 60% ratio claiming that the admiral 
either accepted a ratio below the* minimum required for 
defense or that he was insincere when he argued that Japan 
required a 70% ratio. Viscount Kato stateds "If America, 
as Mx. Hughes declares, has no i itention of taking an offen­
sive attitude, what necessity has she for insisting on her
naval strength, at the rate of 10 to 6 instead of 10 to 
997?N At a January 24 session of the Diet, Mochizuki Kotaro 
of the Kenseikai attacked the foreign policy of the govern­
ment. He characterized the Washington Conference, the 
Dairen Conference, and the Siberian Expedition as complete 
failures. He said that Japan played a poor second at Wash­
ington and lost an opportunity in not insisting on the 
wholesale destruction of Pacific fortresses.100
The government had to secure Privy Council approval of 
the agreements signed in Washington. Such being the case 
the Seiyukai and government officials touted the results of 
the Washington Conference. Three members of the Seiyukai, 
who had returned home from Washington, expressed their 
approval of the conference. Hayashi Kiroku, a counselor 
of the Foreign Ministry stated« "As Japan's future diplo­
macy will probably have to rest to a great extent upon a
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mutual understanding with the United States, it is indeed 
gratifying to feed that a peaceful relationship has been 
consolidated at the Washington Conference between the United 
States and J a p a n . The government responded to Diet
interpellations concerning the agreements. Foreign Minister 
Uchida defended the replacement of the Anglo-Japanese Alli­
ance by the Four Power Pact. He stated that the "Quadruple 
Entente is in line with world advancement and enlarges the
scope of international friendly relations. The Japanese
102Government feels greatly satisfied•" Premier Takahashi 
even denied in the House of Peers that the Government had 
ever insisted on the 70% ratio, or that the ratio had been 
determined as the minimum necessary to the nation's defense. 
He stated:
The Japanese naval experts after finishing their 
investigations, came to the conclusion that Japan 
should be allowed a seventy percent ratio; and 
even though the Government now regards that ratio 
as more adequate to the nation's needs, it has all 
along been cognizant of the fact that an absolute 
stand on this proportion would be ill-advised, if 
the different Powers concerned were to reach an 
agreement. And still more ill-advised would it 
be, in view of the fact that a naval ratio alone 
could not be regarded as an absolute guarantee of 
safety and that the desired adjustment might be 
required in other directions, for example by 
lightening the national tax burdens through putting 
a check on the race for unproductive armaments.103
Baron Shidehara in a statement to the final plenary session
of the conference expressed his opinions on its results.
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Competition in naval armament, ruinous to national 
welfare and harmful to international peace, is now 
a matter of the past. The relief from tension is 
provided by the agreements reached by the Conference 
for the limitation of naval armament, for the sup­
pression of the brutal practices of warfare, and 
for the definition of a policy on matters relating 
to China. . . . Freed from suspicion by frankness, 
assured of peace by good will, we may devoutly 
give thanks for the opportunity given by the 
Washington Conference, which, we believe, ushers 
into a troubled world a new spirit of international 
friendship and good understanding.
The naval arms agreement was a success. It improved
the strategic situation of Japan by saving the Mutsu, limiting
Pacific island fortifications, Mand leaving the navy free to
10 5build submarines, airplanes., and aircraft carriers.*
Kato, "showered with praise upon his return to Japan, 
scarcely three months later . • • became the logical choice 
of the elder statesmen as Prime Minister. The Finance 
Ministry proposed huge cuts for the navy in its fiscal 1922 
budget. They announced these figures on December 20, 1921.
The navy was slated to receive ¥258,492,349 a decrease of 
¥92,746,715 from the previous year. This constituted only 
16% of total revenue as compared to 32% the previous year.
The army was also due for retrenchment. It was to receive
¥56,042,645 a decrease of ¥23,828,546 from the previous v
107 —year. Kato made statements in meetings with BSlfour in 
Washington that although before the navy could get almost 
anything for which it asked, the situation had changed.
Labor organizations, the opposition parties, newspapers, the 
government p a r t y  the public, and business organizations
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ail had plans for the use of saved funds. Spending on
battleships was considered a waste of money unless there
were a distinct threat to the empire; this threat was largely
removed by the arms reduction agreement. The Nichi Nichi
suggested four ways to use the saved fundsi 1) national
resources should be fostered 2) the labor problem should be
attended to 3) industries should be developed, particularly
those which engaged in foreign trade and 4) railway rates
108should be reduced.
CONCLUSION
The images which Japanese held of American policies 
were varied; these images depended on American actions, the 
words of American government officials, the Japanese percep­
tions of their own role in the world, and the position of an 
individual within Japanese society. These images changed 
during the year of 1921 in relation to changing American 
actions and in relation to the changing Japanese domestic 
situation. The images generally improved during the course 
of the year and by the end of the Washington Conference were 
quite positive.
Japanese naval officers felt that they had a duty to 
ensure the security of the empire. To many this necessitated 
that the 8-8 plan be completed. After all, the plan had been 
determined to be necessary to the security of the empire in 
light o* the lessons of the Russo-Japanese War, a war which 
catapulted Japan to the status of an international power. It 
also had been determined that a 70% ratio of the strength 
of an attacking fleet was necessary to ensure victory. The 
completion of the 8-8 fleet would not only improve strategic 
security, but provide domestic power and prestige for the 
navy. American naval policies after 1916 improved the pos­
sibility of the completion of the 8-8 fleet. Japanese naval 
men believed that, as the United States completed its 1916 
building plan, the strategic situation of Japan would only 
deteriorate. Therefore as long as Japanese believed that the
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United States was continuing its 1916 program and fortifying 
Pacific bases the 8-8 fleet was necessary.
The press feared American naval construction. Much of 
the press, since it did not trust the United States, believed 
the worst. It treated unauthorized plans for naval construc­
tion and fortifications as if the fortifications were opera­
tional and as if the battleships were afloat. These news­
papers represented a segment of opinion which did not under­
stand why the United States needed a navy equal to the world's 
greatest. Japan was allied with the power which had held 
the trident and this alliance had served Japanese interests 
well. Japanese also felt that Japan had served British 
interests by participating in the Great War and thereby 
deserved its share of the spoils, i.e., Shantung and the 
South Seas islands. The papers felt that the U.S. was un­
warranted in attempting to change the balance of power. It 
had no right to desire abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance and no need to build such a huge navy. Moreover, 
a people, who had conquered an entire continent and then 
were pushing across the Pacific Ocean, had no right to 
place restrictions on the expansion of a densely populated 
country by refusing to allow immigration, by interfering in 
Japan's bilateral relations with China, or by opposing the 
abolishment of racial discrimination in international rela­
tions.
The early disarmament advocates did not approve of the 
domestic effects of naval competition, a competition which
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was due to American belligetMce. Otaki Yukio felt that Japan 
needed primary schools much more than she needed battleships. 
When he advocated the convening of a disarmament conference 
he had the support of such newspapers as the J i j i , the 
Yomiuri, the Osahe Asahi, and the Osaka Wainichi . though 
other papers did not support Ozaki's Diet resolution they, 
along with labor organizations and the business community, 
cried out for an agreement which would reduce naval spending.
thus, before the proposal of the Washington Conference, 
Admiral Rato, realizing the deteriorating strategic and 
domestic political situation, had stated that the 8-8 plan 
was negotiable. American proposals at the disarmament con­
ference were viewed in a positive manner by the government 
and the business community in particular. Prime Minister 
Takahashi, Ambassador Hayashi, Ambassador Shidehara, and 
Admiral Rato all expressed positive views on American propo­
sals for and the conclusion of an arms limitation agreement. 
These government leaders knew that the future peaceful 
economic development of Japan rested on a sound relation­
ship with the United States. They were, of course, the 
ones who had to deal with the increased post-war power of 
the United States on a practical level; they could not merely 
attack he policies of America as affronts to Japan, as 
nationalistic press organs such as the Yorodzu and the 
Kokurein did. They felt that they could pursue their own 
policies in Asia as long as they settled outstanding differ­
ences with the United States, especially the naval problem,
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difficulties over the island of Yap, and policies toward 
China. Kara Kei, particularly, viewed the American propo­
sal for an arms limitation conference as a boon for him.
He would be able to curb defense spending without decreasing 
security and this would allow him to spend more money on 
pork-barrel projects, such as education, and silence his 
crit ics.
These critics included the business community, which 
like most business communities, wanted lower taxes. They 
more than any other group realized the vital importance 
of the Japanese-American economic relationship and wished 
for taxes to be reduced so that Japanese products would be 
more competitive both in China and in the West. Believing 
this, they worked for the improvement of Japanese-Amerlean 
and Anglo-Japanese relations and interpreted American actions 
in a positive light. They pushed for disarmament and wel­
comed it when it came, discount Shibusawa1s group of leading 
businessmen, who went to America during the same period as 
the conference, expressed in as many places as possible, 
Japanese friendship for the United States and their pure 
motives of economic expansion which necessitated disarmament.
The majority of the navy was in favor of a disarmament 
agreement which would ensure the security of the empire.
This security depended on the strength of the United States. 
Therefore officers advocated that Japan maintain naval 
strength at a 70% ratio of the strength of the American 
fleet. Some members of the navy did not wish to see the
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fize of their organization decrease and others were truly 
worried about the detrimental effect of a naval holiday on 
shipbuilding capacity. Admiral Kato determined that his 
plan would guarantee naval security and with his towering 
prestige due to his actions at the Battle of Tsushima was 
able to override naval dissension and win approval for his 
actions. Still, these actions did preserve the option of 
the construction of submarines, aircraft carriers, and 
auxiliary crafts.
The opposition political parties t pressed suspicion 
of the United States especially when it served their o n 
purposes. The statements made by Viscount Kato are repre­
sentative of this. He expressed dismay at the agreement 
to accept a 60% ratio but also expressed a desire to decrease 
naval spending, even proposing that the powers agree to aban­
don offensive capital ships. The government party opposed 
the passage of the universal suffrage bill but the Kenseikai 
supported it. The Kenseikai, hoping to garner public 
support, took positions which both defended Japanese sov­
ereignty and equality with the West and promised to lower 
the tax burdens of the people.
Japanese sovereignty and equality with the West formed 
the basic framework from which Japanese viewed the world.
From the time they undertook to remove external control of 
their tariff system in the late 19th century, Japanese 
strove to define their own position in the world. The
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controversies over the fortification issue, the Pour Power 
Pact, the Shantung agreement, and immigration all illuminate 
the Japanese desire for equality. Admiral Kato, even though 
he agreed to the inclusion of islands which were part of 
Japan proper in the Pacific area of nonfortification,found 
it very difficult to acknowledge that he had within the 
body of the agreement. He wanted Japan to be, in appearance 
at least, treated equally by the world powers. The Japanese 
government would not agree to include Japan proper under the 
terms of the Four Power Pact. Japanese could not allow the 
perception to exist that they were being treated differently 
than the other Pacific powers. This feeling of being 
treated unequally was prevalent in perceptions of Western, 
particularly American views of Japanese policies toward 
China. Japanese felt that they needed a place from which 
to obtain raw materials and a place to expand. They did not 
deny the American right to expand in the Western Hemisphere. 
They only asked for what they believed to be equal considera­
tion. Japan too needed an area where it had special rights. 
Western opposition to Japan's policies was particularly 
distasteful in view of immigration barriers against Asians, 
which existed in Australia and the United States.
Japanese had an image of America which Americans had 
difficulty understanding. This can be attributed to the 
fact that this image was based, in part, on factors other 
than American actions. Domestic Japanese issues in the early 
20th century were probably even more of a mystery to the
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average American of that period than domestic Japanese 
issues are to Americans today. Hopefully 1 have provide^ 
if only in a simple form, the way in which images can be 
formed and changed rapidly due to foreign actions. Yet one 
cannot forget that these actions do not and cannot form the 
entire basis for images of the nation which performed those 
actions. Therefore,to understand the relations between 
nations and the effects of actions on others,it is necessary 
to try and understand how others perceive those actions. 
Improvement of international relations requires much more 
than explaining one's position as many Japanese believed, 
it requires listening.
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